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For decades, everyday life for a North Korean has been a 
fight to survive a seemingly everlasting food shortage, 
widespread starvation, and economic collapse under a repressive 
regime.1 Among the struggling North Koreans was Ms. Mi-sun 
Bang, a former actress and a widowed mother of three.2 Having 
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1. See Amartya Sen, Foreword to STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, FAMINE IN 
NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM xvi–xviii (2007) [hereinafter FAMINE IN 
NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM] (discussing the effects of North Korea’s 
authoritative and repressive regime in the North Korean famine and widespread 
starvation among the North Korean people); RALPH C. HASSIG & KONGDAN OH, THE 
HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE HERMIT KINGDOM 67 (2009) 
[hereinafter HIDDEN PEOPLE] (referring to the collapse of North Korea’s economy in 
the 1990s in its discussion of North Korea’s economic policies); DAVID HAWK, U.S. 
COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., THE HIDDEN GULAG: THE LIVES AND VOICES OF 
“THOSE WHO ARE SENT TO THE MOUNTAINS” 31 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter LIVES AND 
VOICES] (noting widespread food shortage in North Korea in the 1990s); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, at 341–42 (2013) (stating that 
“North Korea “continues to face serious food insecurity in 2012” and discussing the 
various reasons that caused the food shortages). 
2. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 93 (providing Mrs. Mi-sun Bang’s testimony 
of her experiences in North Korea, China, and North Korean prison camps); see 
Jansovocmf, 04-29-09 North Korean Defector Interviews Bang Mi Sun, YOUTUBE (May 27, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3ZFRewLCi8 (displaying Mi-sun Bang 
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lost her husband to the grips of a merciless famine and driven to 
ensure her children’s survival, Ms. Bang fled to China.3 In 1998, 
on the heels of the Great Famine in North Korea, Ms. Bang, her 
nineteen year old daughter, and her sixteen year old son crossed 
the Sino-North Korean border, an act unlawful in both nations.4 
Unable to contact her daughter who was studying dance and 
acting in Pyongyang, Mi-sun had no choice but to leave her 
behind.5 
Upon arriving in China, human traffickers captured the 
Bang family and threatened to inform Chinese authorities of 
their illegal border crossing.6 Fearing repatriation of her family, 
Mi-sun conceded to a “brokered marriage,” through which a 
disabled Chinese farmer purchased her for 7,000 yuan, or 
US$1,000. 7  Now separated from her children, Mi-sun was 
kidnapped and trafficked on three separate occasions while in 
China. 8  Though Ms. Bang escaped her third husband’s 
menacing grasp, as bitter fate would have it, Chinese officials 
ultimately repatriated her to North Korea.9 
Back in North Korea, Mi-sun was convicted of illegal border 
crossing and detained in several North Korean hard labor prison 
                                                                                                             
speaking in Korean about her experiences); see also N.Korean Defector Recalls Being 
Tortured in Camp, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), May 1, 2009, 11:02 AM, 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/05/01/2009050100328.html 
[hereinafter N.Korean Defector Recalls Being Tortured]. 
3. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 93. 
4. Id.; see HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 118, 230–31 (noting 1998 as the end of 
the three year long North Korean famine of the 1990s, providing the North Korean 
Criminal Code, and discussing China’s practice of repatriating North Korean 
migrants); see also FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, 
at 225 (discussing China’s repatriation policy regarding North Korean migrants). 
5. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining why Ms. Bang was unable to 
leave North Korea with all three of her children). 
6. Id. (“Apprehended by a gang of traffickers who threatened to turn over her 
children to the Chinese police for repatriation, Ms. Bang agreed to a ‘brokered 
marriage’ . . . .”). 
7. Id. at 93–94 (stating that because of the traffickers’ threats, Ms. Bang entered 
into a “brokered marriage” with a handicapped Chinese farmer); see FAMINE IN NORTH 
KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, at 225 (explaining that China 
repatriates all North Korean migrants in China). 
8. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 94 (stating that Ms. Bang was kidnapped and 
trafficked a total of three times and indicating later in her testimony that she was 
separated from her children). 
9 . Id. (detailing abuse by Ms. Bang’s third “husband” and her eventual 
repatriation to North Korea). 
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camps. 10  These prison camps were establishments whereby 
prison guards were authorized to carry out brutal methods of 
punishment.11 When prison guards discovered that Mi-sun was 
deteriorating under the pressure of forced labor, they violently 
beat her head and body.12 The beatings to her legs were so 
severe that Ms. Bang would continue to walk with a limp ten 
years later.13 In addition to her permanently mangled leg and 
weakened physical state, prison guards apportioned food rations 
so small that Mi-sun’s weight plummeted to eighty-eight 
pounds.14 
One especially unsettling punishment technique was the 
practice of forced abortions.15 With no regard to whether they 
were voluntary pregnancies or the product of rape or 
involuntary marriage, prison guards aborted all pregnancies of 
repatriated women suspected of carrying children of Chinese 
descent.16 During her imprisonment, Mi-sun witnessed prison 
guards force two unsuspecting male inmates to jump up and 
down on a board placed over a pregnant woman’s womb.17 As 
one might conclude, neither the child nor the mother 
                                                                                                             
10. Id. at 94–96 (describing Ms. Bang’s experience in North Korean prison 
camps). 
11. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 207–09 (detailing the human rights 
abuses in North Korean prison camps); Marcus Noland, North Korea: The Tyranny of 
Deprivation, in WORST OF THE WORST: DEALING WITH REPRESSIVE AND ROGUE NATIONS 
91 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2007). 
12. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 95 (testifying that Ms. Bang was severely 
beat when she became physically too weak). 
13. Id. (“Her leg became infected to the bone, . . . which caused her to limp 
pronouncedly ten years later.”); see N. Korean Defectors Recalls Being Tortured, supra note 
2 for a photograph of Bang and her injured leg. 
14. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 96 (stating that Ms. Bang’s weight dropped 
to eighty-eight pounds); see N.Korean Defector Recalls Being Tortured, supra note 2 
(providing a photograph of Bang’s injured leg). 
15. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 95 (detailing the forced abortions Mrs. 
Bang witnessed). “[A]long with the . . . high levels of deaths in detention . . . a 
particularly reprehensible phenomenon of repression is the gender-based sexual 
violence and racially motivated forced abortion and infanticide perpetrated against 
forcibly repatriated pregnant women.” Id. at 122. 
16. Id. at 122–23 (discussing racially motivated forced abortions in North Korean 
prison camps). “It makes no difference if the pregnancies resulted from trafficking, or 
coerced or voluntary marriages between Korean women and Han Chinese men in 
China.” Id. at 123. 
17. Id. at 95 (“The guards put her on the floor on her back and placed a board 
over her swollen womb, and pistol-whipped two male prisoners until they agreed to 
jump up and down on the board.”). 
180 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:175 
survived.18 At the completion of an unrelated abortion, a prison 
guard offered an explanation to the deplorable practice, 
declaring that North Korean women “who got Chinese 
sperm . . . brought this on themselves.”19  
In a fortunate turn of events, Mi-sun successfully defected 
to South Korea following her release from imprisonment, 
reunited with her children, and married another North Korean 
defector.20 Regrettably, the same cannot be said for countless 
repatriated North Koreans who witness similar horrors, as many 
will never experience Ms. Bang’s change in luck.21 A byproduct 
of North Korea’s criminalization of unauthorized border 
crossing and China’s obstinate denial of lawful entry is a 
prolonged, if not constant, fear of institutionalized oppression.22 
Manifested in Ms. Bang’s testimony, the ramifications of life for 
North Korean migrants in China are the risks of endangerment 
to their lives, personal safety, and liberty.23 
                                                                                                             
18. Id. at 95 (testifying that both the infant and the mother died from the forced 
abortion). 
19. Id. at 153 (detailing the testimony of a former detainee who witnessed 
multiple forced abortions through injections of the drug ravenol). 
20. Id. at 98 (describing events following Ms. Bang’s release from imprisonment 
and her subsequent successful defection to South Korea). 
21. See id. at 123–47 for first-hand former detainees’ testimonies of human rights 
violations in North Korean prison camps; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE 
INVISIBLE EXODUS: NORTH KOREANS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 24–28 (2002) 
[hereinafter INVISIBLE EXODUS] (detailing accounts of former detainees). 
22. See Tsuneo Akaha, Cross-Border Human Flows in Northeast Asia, MIGRATION 
INFO. SOURCE (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.migrati oninformation.org/feature/
print.cfm?ID=257 (noting that North Korean migrants are “under [the] constant fear 
of exposure and arrest” while in China); Nicholas Eberstadt & Christopher Griffin, 
Saving North Korea’s Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/opinion/19eberstadt.html?pagewanted=allW
www&_r=0 (“As illegal immigrants in China . . . they live in constant fear and at terrible 
risk.”); JACQUES L. FUQUA, JR., KOREAN UNIFICATION: THE INEVITABLE CHALLENGES 83 
(2007) (explaining that “saeteomin live in constant fear that Chinese authorities or 
North Korean agents will apprehend and repatriate them back to North Korea”). 
Saeteomin is a Korean term for North Korean migrants or refugees, and literally 
translates to “new settler.” YOUNG-YOON KIM, KOR. INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, A 
STUDY ON THE REALITY AND PROSPECT OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN NORTH KOREA: TASKS 
FOR SUCCESSFUL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN SYSTEM 2 (March 2007). 
23 . See, e.g., U.S. COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., LIVES FOR SALE: 
PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF WOMEN FLEEING NORTH KOREA TO CHINA 28–29 (2009) 
[hereinafter LIVES FOR SALE] (detailing personal accounts of the mistreatment North 
Korean migrant women in China were forced to suffer); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 
21, at 2 (“[T]he migrants remain hidden [in China] for fear of discovery, repatriation, 
and harsh punishment in North Korea . . . .”); Kaitlin Brush, East Asia, 18 HUM. RTS. 
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North Korean migrants are systematically barred from 
crossing the Sino-North Korean border into Chinese territory.24 
At the outset, enforced by the North Korean Criminal Code, 
North Korean citizens do not enjoy the freedom to leave the 
nation for China.25  Accompanying the North Korean law is 
China’s policy of automatically repatriating all North Korean 
migrants.26 Since North Korean migrants are not authorized to 
cross the Sino-North Korean border, the North Korean regime 
will punish the repatriated migrant by imprisonment, torture, or 
death. 27  Additionally, China denies the United Nations, 
nongovernmental organizations (“NGO”), and other human 
rights organizations access to North Korean migrants in China 
and penalizes persons discovered harboring or providing 
assistance to the migrants.28 
                                                                                                             
BRIEF 38, 39 (2010) (stating that “repatriated individuals face imprisonment, torture, 
and death”); Alison Carrinski, Note, The Other North Korean Dilemma: Evaluating U.S. 
Law Towards North Korean Refugees, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 647, 662–64 (2008) 
(noting illegal sex trafficking in China as a significant risk to North Korean women in 
China due to the illegal economic migrant status); Elisa Gahng, Note, North Korean 
Border-Crossers in Yanbian: The “Protection Gap” Between the Economic Migrant and Refugee 
Regime, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 361, 367 (2010) (stating that Chinese officials often beat 
North Korean migrants when discovered). 
24. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 2 (“To reach China, [North Korean 
migrants] have defied their government’s criminal prohibition on illegal exit and 
China’s rigorous border controls.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 368 (noting 
China’s view that all North Korean migrants in China are economic migrants, and thus 
China’s claim that it has a duty to North Korea to repatriate the migrants). 
25. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 20–21 for the North Korean Criminal 
Code prohibiting unauthorized border crossing; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
NORTH KOREA: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, OPINION AND EXPRESSION (2009) [hereinafter 
NORTH KOREA: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT]; LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 14 (stating 
that North Korean guards have been ordered to “shoot-to-kill” those attempting to 
cross North Korean borders). 
26. See Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and 
Social Order in the Border Areas, NKFREEDOM, http://www.nkfreedom.org/
UploadedDocuments/NK-China-bilateral_treaty.pdf, at art 4,  (last visited Nov. 13. 203) 
[hereinafter Repatriation Treaty] (purporting to be an English translation of the 
agreement, which is not available in official form) (agreement signed Aug. 12, 1986) 
(providing the text of a Sino-North Korean bilateral treaty through which China 
promised to repatriate all unauthorized North Korean migrants in China); Gahng, 
supra note 23, at 361, 366–68 (discussing the Sino-North Korean bilateral treaty and 
China’s repatriation policy to forcibly deport all illegal North Korean migrants). 
27. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 20–21 (providing Article 47 and 117 of 
the North Korean Criminal Code, punishing illegal border-crossing and defection by 
imprisonment or death); Brush, supra note 23. 
28 . See LEONARD LEO, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2010, at 115 (2010); Alyce S. Ahn, Note, Prosecution or 
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China is a contracting party to the United Nation’s 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol (collectively the “Refugee Convention”), an 
international treaty governing refugee rights.29 In accordance 
with the Refugee Convention, China is prohibited from the 
forcible deportation of a “refugee.” 30  Nevertheless, China 
maintains that its policy to repatriate North Korean migrants 
does not contravene the Refugee Convention.31 
First, although the motives for leaving North Korea vary per 
migrant from economic reasons to political persecution, China 
concludes that all North Korean migrants in China are 
“economic migrants.”32 Since the Refugee Convention does not 
                                                                                                             
Persecution: Contradiction Between U.S. Foreign Policy & the Adjudication of Asylum Claims 
Involving the Harboring of North Korean Refugees, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 311, 312, 316 
(2010) (describing China’s policy of refusing third parties access to North Korean 
migrants in China); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 17 (discussing China’s practice 
of arresting those who provide North Korean migrants in China humanitarian aid). 
29. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention] for the text of the Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”); Status Table for the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (last visited Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2
&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection 1951 
Refugee Convention] (showing the date China became a signatory party to the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, or the “1951 Refugee Convention”); 
Status Table for the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (last 
visited Oct. 12, 20120), http://treaties.un.org/pages/ShowMTDSGDetails.aspx? src=
UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en#Participants 
[hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection 1967 Protocol] (showing the date China became a 
signatory to the 1967 Protocol, a supplementing treaty to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, collectively the “Refugee Convention”). 
30. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, arts. 1, 33 (defining the term 
“refugee” in Article 1 and prohibiting repatriation of refugees in Article 33). 
31. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing China’s “economic 
migrants” classification of North Korean migrants); Ahn, supra note 28, at 316; 
INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 16; Gahng, supra note 23, at 370–72 (explaining 
that China labels North Korean migrants as “economic migrants” as a justification for 
its repatriation policy). 
32. See HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMM., GLOBAL SECURITY: JAPAN 
AND KOREA, 2007-8 H.C. 449, para. 192 (U.K.) (Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter GLOBAL 
SECURITY] (“The diversity of North Koreans in China means that no single term is 
appropriate for the whole population; the FCO notes that those involved are referred 
to variously as ‘defectors’, refugees’, ‘escapees’ or ‘border-crossers.’”); see also CONG.-
EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 112TH CONG., ANNUAL REP. 2011, at 28 (1st Sess. 2011) 
[hereinafter CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2011] (stating that China repatriates North 
Korean migrants under its “economic migrant” classification); Jane Kim, Note, 
Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the Foreign-Bride Industry, 15 VA. 
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extend its protection to those outside their home countries for 
purely economic reasons, the migrants fall outside the treaty’s 
scope.33 Second, China contends that it is bound by a 1986 
bilateral agreement with North Korea whereby China promised 
to repatriate all unauthorized North Korean migrants within its 
territory.34 China argues that its bilateral treaty obligations to 
North Korea preempt its treaty obligations to the United 
Nations.35 
This Note analyzes China’s justifications for its repatriation 
policy and determines if North Korean migrants in China are 
“refugees” under the Refugee Convention. It explores whether 
China’s repatriation policy concerning North Korean migrants 
constitutes a breach of its duties to the Refugee Convention, the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”), and China’s 
Extradition Law. 36  The Note’s purpose is to determine the 
legality of China’s repatriation policy under international law, 
emphasize China’s obligations to the United Nations, and 
                                                                                                             
J. INT’L L. 443, 457 (2011) (noting that many women also flee North Korea, not only 
for economic reasons, but because of gender, class, and political discrimination); Kyu 
Chang Lee, Protection of North Korean Defectors in China and the Convention Against 
Torture, 6 REGENT J. INT’L L. 139, 139 (2008) (examining the difference in opinions of 
whether North Korean migrants are “refugees” under the Refugee Convention’s 
definition). 
33. See K.M. GREENHILL, WEAPONS OF MASS MIGRATION: FORCED DISPLACEMENT, 
COERCION, AND FOREIGN POLICY 237 (2010) (“Beijing has found a loophole to avoid its 
obligations, insisting that the North Koreans are illegal migrants, not refugees.”); Kyu 
Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 140–42 (noting that “refugees” who are provided 
protection under the Refugee Convention are limited and do not necessarily include 
migrants who are outside their home country for economic reasons); see also CECC 
ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 32, at 28–29 (“[China] continue[s] [its] policies of 
classifying all North Koreans in China as ‘illegal’ economic migrants and repatriating 
North Korean refugees in China . . . .”). 
34. Repatriation Treaty, supra note 26; see Carrinski, supra note 23, at 650 
(referring to China’s bilateral treaty with North Korea to repatriate all unauthorized 
North Korean migrants in China). 
35. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 16 (“[China] maintains . . . that its 
primary obligation lies under a 1986 agreement with North Korea on the repatriation 
of migrants.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 370. 
36 . Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
CAT] (providing the text of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, or “CAT”); Extradition Law of the 
People’s Republic of China art. 8 (Order No. 42/2000) [hereinafter PRC Extradition 
Law], available at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/22/content_68710.htm. 
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recommend a pragmatic solution to China’s incongruent 
obligations to the United Nations and to North Korea. 
First, Part I of the Note introduces the political and social 
structure of the North Korean regime and the demanding 
conditions of North Korean life. Part I also describes the 
Chinese government’s treatment of North Korean migrants and 
the risks the migrants face once within China. Second, Part II 
examines the Refugee Convention, the CAT, and China’s 
Extradition Law, laws that require China to protect the 
individuals that conform to the legally defined “refugee” and 
migrants at risk of subjection to torture if repatriated. Part II 
then analyzes China’s respective duties to its multilateral treaties 
with the United Nations, its bilateral agreement with North 
Korea, and its domestic law. Finally, Part III asserts that China’s 
repatriation policy is a transgression from international law and 
proposes that China remove its “economic migrants” blanket 
categorization. Part III recommends that China implement 
individual assessment procedures, in conformance with the 
Refugee Convention, to determine the refugee status of North 
Korean migrants in China. 
I. THE BACKGROUND CHECK: THE ISOLATED AND 
MYSTERIOUS NORTH KOREA AND ITS ENDURING KINSHIP 
WITH CHINA 
First, Part I.A offers a look inside the secretive State, 
summarizing North Korea’s political history and philosophy, 
social class structure, and penal system. Then, Part I.B discusses 
recent events in North Korea that have required the 
international community’s involvement and attention. Part I.B 
explores the conditions in North Korea that galvanized mass 
North Korean migration into China and briefly discusses several 
recent headlines surrounding the ruling dynastic family. Finally, 
Part I.C examines China’s relationship with North Korea and 
the treatment of North Korean migrants inside Chinese borders. 
Part I.C presents China’s repatriation policy with respect to 
North Korean migrants and discusses the policy’s effects on the 
migrants. 
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A. The Hermit Kingdom of the East: A Glimpse into the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea 
According to the North Korean government, Kim Il Sung 
was the first official leader in 1948 of the newly established one-
party totalitarian state, the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (“DPRK”), commonly known as North Korea.37 North 
Korea’s official history credits Kim Il Sung as the founder of the 
nation’s only political party, the Workers’ Party of Korea 
(“WPK”).38  Kim Jong-il, Kim Il Sung’s eldest son, inherited 
supreme leadership of North Korea upon his father’s death in 
1994 and led the nation until 2011.39 As of 2013, under the rule 
of Kim Il Sung’s grandson, Kim Jong-un, North Korea has 
maintained its single-party polity.40 A totalitarian leader of the 
                                                                                                             
37 . See Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
[DPRK Constitution] Apr. 2009, pmbl., available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/
kn00000_.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (showing the text of the North Korean 
Constitution and naming Kim Il Sung as the founder of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, or DPRK); RACHEL A. KOESTLER-GRACK, KIM IL SUNG AND KIM JONG 
IL 104 (2004) (stating that Kim Il Sung’s reign began in 1948); BRADLEY K. MARTIN, 
UNDER THE LOVING CARE OF THE FATHERLY LEADER: NORTH KOREA AND THE KIM 
DYNASTY 430 (St. Martin’s Griffin ed. 2006) (explaining that Kim Il Sung’s regime was 
“more totalitarian than Hitler’s” because it was a one-party regime). It is debated if Kim 
Il Sung was, in fact, the first leader of North Korea, as some sources claim Kim Yong 
Bom was the first official leader. See Ilpyong J. Kim, Kim Jong Il’s Military-First Politics, in 
NORTH KOREA: THE POLITICS OF REGIME SURVIVAL 71 (Young Whan Kihl & Hong Nack 
Kim eds., 2006) (arguing that Kim Yom Bong was the first leader of North Korea). 
38 . Workers’ Party of Korea, NAENARA, http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/great/
political.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). Naenara is the North Korean government’s 
official web portal. NAENARA, http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2013); Kyungmin Ko et al., The Internet Dilemma and Control Policy: Political and Economic 
Implications of the Internet in North Korea, 21 KOR. J. DEF. ANALYSIS 279, 295 (2009) 
(stating that Naenara is the North Korean government’s official web portal). See also 
PATRICK MCEACHEM, INSIDE THE RED BOX: NORTH KOREA’S POST-TOTALITARIAN 
POLITICS 84 (2010) (providing the history of the North Korea Communist Party). 
39. See RANDY WOOD & CARMINE DELUCA, DICTATOR’S HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL 
MANUAL FOR THE ASPIRING TYRANT 64 (2012) (showing that Kim Jong-il ruled North 
Korea from 1994 to 2011); David E. Sanger, Kim Il Sung Dead at Age 82; Led North Korea 
5 Decades; Was Near Talks with South, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/09/world/kim-il-sung-dead-at-age-82-led-north-
korea-5-decades-was-near-talks-with-south.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; see also 
Koestler-Grack, supra note 37 (dating the birth of Kim Il Sung’s first child, Kim Jong-il, 
in 1944). 
40. See STATE OF TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 
SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR i (Gillian Duncan et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
STATE OF TERRORISM] (stating that today, North Korea still exists as a “totalitarian one-
party state”); Notice to All Party Members, Servicepersons and People, KOREAN CENTRAL 
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WPK serves as the head of state and presides as the nation’s 
supreme leader.41 The North Korean military is a ruling class 
and the “supreme commander of the state, party, and society.”42 
Kim Il Sung’s leadership also outlived his death and he remains 
as the “eternal President of the Republic.”43 
North Korea embraces a political philosophy called Juche, a 
derivative of Marxism-Leninism.44 Simply translated, Juche means 
self-reliance or self-determination.45 This uniquely North Korean 
political philosophy is based on three principles: political 
sovereignty, economic independence, and military self-
                                                                                                             
NEWS AGENCY (Pyongyang) (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/
201112/news19/20111219-04ee.html [hereinafter Notice to All Party Members] 
(announcing Kim Jong-un as the new leader of North Korea); North Korea Declares Kim 
Jong Un As Country’s New ‘Supreme Leader,’ NBCNEWS.COM (Dec. 29, 2011, 3:07 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45813667/#.UVeM5av5lcM (reporting that Kim Jong-un, 
Kim Jong-il’s son, is the new successor and “supreme leader” of North Korea). 
41 . See YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK 87, 379 (2003) 
[hereinafter NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK] (describing North Korea as a single-party 
dictatorship and noting that the “population is one part of a giant, unified ‘socialist 
organism’ . . . created by [a] . . . merging of the supreme leader, party and the 
people”). See generally STATE OF TERRORISM, supra note 40. 
42. See Ilpyong J. Kim, supra note 37, at 59, 61 (“Kim Jong Il has successfully 
transformed North Korea from a party-state system to a military-first political system.”); 
see also BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA & JONGRYN MO, HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, 
REVOLUTION AND PEACE, NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL STABILITY 
2 (1996). 
43. DPRK Constitution, pmbl. (declaring Kim Il Sung as the “eternal President of 
the Republic” in the North Korean Constitution). As of 2013, the North Korean 
Constitution has been amended a total of six times, the most recent amendment being 
in May 2012. MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34256, NORTH KOREA’S 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: TECHNICAL ISSUES 17 (2013) (“In May 2012, North Korea changed 
its constitution to say that it was a ‘nuclear-armed state.’”); N. Korea Calls Itself ‘Nuclear-
Armed State’ in Revised Constitution, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Seoul) (May 30, 2012, 8:52 
PM), http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/05/30/76/0401000000AE
N20120530005200315F.HTML; see also Political System, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
KOREA, http://www.korea-dpr.com/political.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (stating 
on North Korea’s official website that Kim Il Sung is the “eternal President of the 
Republic”). 
44 . See PAUL FRENCH, NORTH KOREA: THE PARANOID PENINSULA: MODERN 
HISTORY 30 (2d. ed. 2007) (describing Juche as a derivative of Marxism-Leninism); 
Patricia Goedde, Note, Law “Of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the North 
Korean Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265, 1272 (2004) (noting that North 
Korea’s Juche ideology is a reflection of Marxism-Leninism). 
45. See Goedde, supra note 44 (translating Juche to mean “self reliance” or “self 
determination”); see also French, supra note 44, at 117 (describing North Korea as “a 
country with a guiding philosophy of self-reliance and planned self-sufficiency”). 
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defense.46  The North Korean government’s unwillingness to 
participate in foreign affairs has led many to describe the nation 
as a “hermit kingdom.”47 
1. The North Korean Class Structure and Institutionalized 
Repression 
North Korean citizens are primarily divided into three 
classes, which are ranked by loyalty to the regime: the core class 
(haek-sim kyechung), the wavering class (tong-yo kyechung), and the 
hostile class (jok-tae kyechung). 48  In a population of roughly 
twenty-three million people, the core class (i.e. elite members of 
the government and ruling party) represents twenty-five to thirty 
percent of the people. 49  Fifty percent of the population 
embodies the wavering class, which are those who defected from 
South Korea after the Korean War, technicians, teachers, 
enlisted soldiers, farmers, and former merchants. 50  The 
remaining twenty to twenty-five percent is the hostile class.51 The 
hostile class members are those whose family members fled to 
                                                                                                             
46. Juche Ideology, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, http://www.korea-
dpr.com/juche_ideology.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) [hereinafter OFFICIAL DPRK: 
JUCHE] (providing on North Korea’s official website that the guiding principles of Juche 
are “independence, self-reliance and self-defence”); see Goedde, supra note 44, at 1273 
(discussing the three principles of North Korea’s political philosophy). 
47. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 4, 172–75 (explaining why North Korea is 
nicknamed “the Hermit Kingdom,” as well as discussing the Juche ideology and its 
effect on North Korean foreign relations); see also RON FRIDELL, DICTATORSHIP 104 
(2007) (describing North Korea as a highly secretive nation that rarely allows foreign 
citizens into the country). 
48. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198 (describing the North Korean class 
system); see also KONGDAN OH & RALPH C. HASSIG, NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE 
LOOKING GLASS 133 (2000) [hereinafter THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS] (listing the 
three classes of North Korean society); French, supra note 44, at 42. 
49. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198 (stating that thirty percent of the 
North Korean population belongs to the core class); see also French, supra note 44, at 42 
(stating that twenty-five percent of the North Korean population falls within the core 
class). 
50. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198 (describing the wavering class as 
almost the majority of the North Korean population and that it consists of primarily 
those who do not belong to the core class or hostile class); see also French, supra note 
44, at 42. 
51. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198, 202 (noting that twenty percent of 
the North Korean population belongs to the hostile class); THROUGH THE LOOKING 
GLASS, supra note 48, at 133 (estimating that twenty-eight percent of the North Korean 
population belongs to the hostile class); see also French, supra note 44, at 42 (claiming 
that twenty-five percent of the North Korean population belongs to the hostile class). 
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South Korea during the Korean War, defectors, relatives of 
defectors, landowners, and any others who carry “political 
taint.”52 Hostile class members are refused certain rights, such as 
rights to obtain education, employment, and medical services.53 
Human rights organizations consistently rank North Korea 
as one of the worst human rights violators in the world.54 North 
Korea does not afford its citizens freedom of expression, 
movement, or organization.55 Opposition to the supreme leader 
or to the regime is severely punished and the government 
meticulously controls and limits access to media and 
information.56 The regime offers virtually no due process, trial, 
or judicial review. 57  Crimes ranging from murder to mere 
                                                                                                             
52. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 198, 202 (describing the hostile class); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A MATTER OF SURVIVAL: THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S 
CONTROL OF FOOD AND THE RISK OF HUNGER 6 (2006) [hereinafter A MATTER OF 
SURVIVAL] (“Those labeled members of the ‘hostile’ class, such as former landowners, 
collaborators during the Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula, and families of 
defectors and escapees who made their way to South Korea, are at the bottom of the 
state’s priorities.”). 
53. See KOR. INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
NORTH KOREA 2005, at 108 (2005) [hereinafter KINU WHITE PAPER 2005] (describing 
the rights denied to hostile class members in North Korea); see also JIYOUNG SONG, 
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES IN NORTH KOREA: POST-COLONIAL, MARXIST AND 
CONFUCIAN PERSPECTIVES 103 (2011). 
54 . See, e.g., North Korea, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013 (last visited Jan. 20, 2013, 3:00 PM) 
(noting that in its 2013 publication of Freedom in the World, North Korea was included as 
one of the nine out of forty seven countries considered as “not free” to have the lowest 
possible rating for political rights and civil liberties); see also GLOBAL SECURITY, supra 
note 32, para. 175 (“We conclude that the North Korean regime is one of the worst 
human rights abusers in the world . . . .”). 
55. See N. Kor. Human Rights: An Update: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Asia, the 
Pacific, and the Global Env’t of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 6 (2007) 
(statement of Eni Faleomavaega, Chairman, Subcomm. on Asia, the Pacific, and the 
Global Env’t) [hereinafter Hearing: North Korean Human Rights] (stating “North 
Koreans have no freedom of expression or movement”); see also NORTH KOREA: 
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, supra note 26. 
56 . See RHODA MARGESSON et al., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34189, NORTH 
KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 
AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 8 (2007) [hereinafter CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE] 
(discussing the ban on any dissent of the supreme leader, the lack of access to media, 
and the “severe physical abuse meted out to citizens who violate laws and restrictions”); 
see also ANDREW SCOBELL, KIM JONG IL AND NORTH KOREA: THE LEADER AND THE 
SYSTEM 30 (2006) (discussing the North Korean government’s restrictions on North 
Korean access to media sources and information). 
57. See PAOLO CAMMAROTA ET AL., LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 16 (2007) (“Government security forces routinely arrest and 
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familial relations with a defector will result in incarceration in a 
hard labor prison camp.58 The State often arbitrarily detains 
persons and imposes sentences as severe as lifetime 
imprisonment and death.59 
2. The North Korean Penal System 
The North Korean prison system is divided into four 
categories of hard labor penal facilities, or gulags.60 Kwan-li-so 
prison camps, or long-term political penal colonies, imprison 
political dissidents, together with up to three generations of the 
relatives of political offenders.61  Kyo-hwa-so penitentiaries are 
long-term institutions that detain individuals charged with 
criminal and political felonies.62 Jip-kyeol-so facilities are short-
                                                                                                             
imprison persons, holding them incommunicado without any possibility of a fair trial 
or judicial review.”); see also JOYCE HART, KIM JONG IL: LEADER OF NORTH KOREA 103 
(2008) (noting the absence of due process in North Korea’s penal system); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012: EVENTS OF 2011, at 356 (2012) (listing arbitrary 
arrest and detention and the lack of due process as some of North Korea’s violations of 
basic human rights); Ibp Usa, NORTH KOREA: GENERAL SECRETARY KIM JONG IL 
HANDBOOK 89 (2011) (explaining that the North Korean Central Court does not have 
the power of judicial review over executive and legislative actions). 
58. Imprisonment as a result of the individual’s familial relations to the defector is 
known as “guilt-by-association.” IAN JEFFRIES, NORTH KOREA: A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 18 (2006) (noting that thousands of North Koreans 
have been imprisoned solely for a relative’s violation of a law under the theory of guilt-
by-association); see also MIKE KIM, ESCAPING NORTH KOREA: DEFIANCE AND HOPE IN THE 
WORLD’S MOST REPRESSIVE COUNTRY 113 (2010); Cammarota, supra note 57, at 17 
(explaining that “guilt-by association” is “the idea of ‘collective responsibility’ whereby 
multiple generations of the offender’s family are also imprisoned”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, 
supra note 21, at 24. 
59. See PAUL CLOSE & DAVID ASKEW, ASIA PACIFIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A GLOBAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 4 (2004) (listing the North Korean regime’s usage of 
torture, the death penalty, and arbitrary detention and imprisonment as “serious 
human rights violations”); Cammarota, supra note 57, at 16 (noting that the North 
Korean government often arrests prisoners absent any judicial process or explanation 
and then imposes lifetime sentences in hard labor camps). 
60. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at xi, 9 (describing the North Korean 
penal system as a “gulag system” and distinguishing the different North Korean prison 
facilities); see also Kita Choa Ch Kikokusha no Seimei to Jinken o Mamoru Kai, LIFE & 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, SOCIETY TO HELP RETURNEES TO NORTH KOREA, 34–
36 (2003) (providing an in-depth discussion on the North Korean detention systems); 
Cammarota, supra note 57, at 16–19; INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 22, at 23–24. 
61. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9 (describing Kwan-li-so prison camps); 
see also Cammarota, supra note 57, at 17–18. 
62. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9 (describing kyo-hwa-so penitentiary 
camps); see also Cammarota, supra note 58, at 19. 
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term prison centers that incarcerate those who have committed 
criminal and political misdemeanors. 63  Ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae 
“mobile labor brigades” are short-term labor camps instituted to 
accommodate the overcrowding of repatriated individuals 
within the other prisons.64 
The type of offense committed is used to further identify 
the varying degrees of punishment to follow.65 Particularly, the 
regime distinguishes political offenses as especially 
contemptible. 66  For example, irrespective of the detainee’s 
initial motives for border crossing, subsequent contact with a 
South Korean citizen or a religious organization is perceived as 
an anti-state act and a political offense.67 A repatriated migrant 
charged as a non-political offender is incarcerated in the short-
term jip-kyeol-so or ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae facilities.68 A repatriated 
                                                                                                             
63. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9, 121 (providing an alternate spelling 
to jip-kyeol-so and stating that “jip-kyul-so shorter-term detention facilities” detain 
individuals for misdemeanor-level offenses, both criminal and political); see also 
Cammarota, supra note 57, at 19. 
64. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 9, 121 (describing ro-dong-danryeon-dae 
“mobile labor brigades”); see also Cammarota, supra note 57, at 19. 
65. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120–47 (detailing the different types of 
detention centers for those repatriated from China and providing testimony from 
former detainees); see also STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, WITNESS TO THE 
TRANSFORMATION: REFUGEE INSIGHTS INTO NORTH KOREA 92 (2011) [hereinafter 
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION] (providing a table that illustrates the North 
Korean prison system). 
66. See DAVID HAWK, U.S. COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., EXPOSING 
NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS: PRISONERS’ TESTIMONIES AND SATELLITE 
PHOTOGRAPHS 12 (2003) [hereinafter EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS] 
(explaining that North Korea views contact with a South Korean as a political offense); 
LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 119–20 (detailing North Korean penal system 
procedures in detaining repatriated North Koreans believed to have committed a 
political offense); see also Cammarota, supra note 58, at 62 (noting North Korea’s 
implementation of capital punishment for political offenders). 
67. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 8, 25, 86, 120–22 (explaining that 
contact with South Koreans, Korean-Americans, or religious institutions is considered 
“hostile” to the regime and an “anti-state” act); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 
21, at 2 (“Migrants who . . . have any contact with South Koreans or other non-Chinese 
foreigners, including missionaries and humanitarian workers . . . are liable to severe 
punishments, even including death, if discovered and returned to North Korea.”). 
68. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120–21 (explaining that repatriated 
migrants from China who are charged with only the crime of illegal border crossing 
with no political component are imprisoned at the short-term prison facilities); 
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 98 (“[L]egal treatment of border 
crossing . . . was demoted from the equivalent of treason to a misdemeanor offense for 
those showing no political motives.”). 
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North Korean migrant charged with one of the ideological 
offenses, however, is imprisoned in a long-term kwan-li-so or kyo-
hwa-so prison.69 
To determine the level of punishment, North Korean 
officials first interrogate the repatriated upon their arrival.70 
North Korean authorities extensively inquire into the migrant’s 
motives for departure and conduct in China to establish if the 
individual committed any political offenses. 71  These 
interrogation centers employ methods of physical abuse and 
public humiliation to compel repatriated migrants to confess to 
political crimes.72 Once the authorities are content with the 
detainee’s confessions, the migrant is sent to the appropriate 
prison facility based on the type and level of the crime 
committed.73 
The North Korean government has never admitted to the 
existence of these hard labor prison facilities.74 In fact, North 
                                                                                                             
69. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (explaining that repatriated 
individuals who are found to have come into contact with a South Korean or Christian 
will be sent to a kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so prison facility); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra 
note 21, at 24; WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATIOn, supra note 65, at 92–93 (illustrating 
in a table and discussing the North Korean prison system). 
70. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 119–20 (describing the process of 
interrogation of the repatriated North Koreans); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATIOn, 
supra note 65, at 29, 92–93. 
71. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 119–20 (describing North Korea’s 
interrogation procedures to determine if the migrant’s reason for leaving or conduct in 
China had a political component); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, 
at 29, 92–93 (“A defector who is sent back to North Korea is subject to interrogation 
and investigation . . . . If the [National Security Agency] concludes that the defector 
crossed the border for economic reasons, the new code stipulates sentences of up to 
two years of ‘labor correction.’”). 
72 . See supra note 71 and accompanying text (detailing North Korean 
interrogation techniques). 
73. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (“If the case has a political 
component-if the person admits to having met South Koreans or watched South 
Korean TV or movies, or sometimes having gone to a Korean-Chinese church, 
the . . . police retain detainee.”); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 
29, 92–93 (providing a chart illustrating the detention centers and sentences for 
prisoners detained for political offenses). 
74. See Chico Harlan, South Korean Report Details Alleged Abuses at North Korea’s 
Prison Camps, WASH. POST, (May 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
south-korean-report-details-alleged-abuses-at-north-koreas-prison-camps/2012/05/09/
gIQA794LDU_story.html (stating that “North Korea officially denies the existence of 
such camps”); Stephanie Nebehay, North Korea Blurs Lines Between Prison Camps, Villages: 
Amnesty, REUTERS, (Mar. 6, 2013, 10:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
03/07/us-korea-north-amnesty-idUSBRE92600820130307. 
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Korea adamantly rejects such allegations.75 Despite the regime’s 
denial of a state-run network of gulags, numerous witness and 
former prisoner testimonies and satellite images indicate that 
the North Korean regime has created a nationwide gulag system 
consisting of at least six political penal camps.76 In 2012, the 
Korea Institute for National Unification (“KINU”) estimated 
that about 150,000 to 200,000 prisoners were currently detained 
in one of the six North Korean hard labor gulags.77 The 2012 
KINU report further states, “[t]he South Korean government 
reported to the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee 
that there were ‘an estimated 154,000 political prisoners 
detained in six Political Concentration Camps’ throughout 
North Korea.”78 
3. A Look Inside North Korea’s Secret Gulags 
Within the North Korean penal camps, prison guards assign 
prisoners to forced labor under formidable conditions.79 These 
                                                                                                             
75. See supra note 75 and accompanying text for the reports of the North Korean 
government’s denial of the existence of the hard labor prison camps. 
76. See generally LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1 (offering an in-depth report on 
North Korean gulags, with first-hand testimonies by witnesses and former gulag 
inmates, computer-generated images of the hard labor prison facilities originally hand-
drawn by former prison inmates, and satellite images of the locations); see also UN ‘to 
Investigate N.Korean Prison Camps,’ CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul) (Mar. 26, 2013, 9:45 AM), 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/26/2013032600604.html 
(“It’s possible to take [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un to the [International 
Criminal Court] just through analysis of various data including satellite images and 
interviews with some 25,000 defectors in South Korea.”) (quoting Ha Tae-kyoung, 
South Korean lawmaker of the Saenuri Party, a major political party of the South 
Korean government). 
77. The Korea Institute for National Unification (“KINU”) is a South Korean 
research institute funded by the South Korean government, “the hub of research on 
North Korea[,] and unification and a locus for the international network on Korean 
peninsula issues.” Mission & History, KOREA INST. NAT’L UNIFICATION, 
http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/about/about_02_01.jsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); KOR. 
INST. FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 
2012, at 147 [hereinafter KINU WHITE PAPER 2012]. 
78. KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 77, at 148; see Jeffries, supra note 58, at 
163 (“North Korea holds some 154,000 political prisoners in six large camps across the 
country, according to South Korean government estimates.”). 
79. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at xi, 162 (discussing some methods of 
torture and punishment executed by guards onto prisoners as “causing great suffering 
and injury to . . . mental health” and describing the labor camps as a “gulag system”). 
“The severe working conditions imposed on deliberately underfed prisoners, 
particularly in the mining and lumber processing sectors of the labor camps (which 
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hard labor gulags expose prisoners to high risks of mental harm, 
physical injury, and death.80 Further, prison food ration systems 
allocate to each prisoner portions of food, such as corn powder 
or cabbage-based gruel, that fall far below subsistence level.81 
The US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea 
(“HRNK”) found that the prison camps intentionally implement 
“the regimen of chronic semi-starvation provid[ing] only 
enough food to [keep prisoners] perpetually on the verge of 
starvation” in order to “generate[] large numbers of informants 
among the prisoners, leading to a prison-camp culture of 
extreme distrust and hostility.”82 
Grueling labor requirements and meager food portions 
compel prisoners to scavenge for rats, tree bark, snakes, and 
grass to stave off starvation, illness, and death. 83  Critically 
                                                                                                             
lead to a large number of industrial accidents and deaths) could also be deemed ‘other 
inhuman acts.’” Id. See also Jeffries, supra note 58, at 90 (reporting that in North Korean 
prison camps “hundreds of thousands of prisoners work, often to their deaths”); 
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 95 (stating that in North Korean 
prison camps, the “conditions in the facilities . . . even have a psychological impact, in 
effect terrorizing those who are detained”). 
80 . See supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the physical and 
psychological impact of the North Korean prison camps). 
81. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 86 (explaining that prisoners are fed 
very small meals, keeping prisoners constantly on the verge of starvation). “Former 
Prisoner #37 was given boiled corn husks, corn powder gruel and some soybeans in a 
dirty plastic bowl.” Id.; see also North Korean Prison Camps Are ‘Like Hitler’s Auschwitz’, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:59 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/survivors-
liken-north-korean-prison-camps-to-holocaust-2013-2 (providing one former prisoner’s 
description of prison camp meals as “tiny rations of mainly cabbage-based gruel”). 
82. The U.S. Committee on Human Rights in North Korea (“HRNK”) is a 
nongovernmental organization (“NGO”) comprised of “a distinguished group of 
foreign policy and human rights specialists” whose purpose is to advocate for human 
rights in North Korea. About HRNK, COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOR., 
http://www.hrnk.org/about/about-hrnk.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). LIVES AND 
VOICES, supra note 1, at 31, 33; see also NANCY DZIEDZIC, WORLD POVERTY 59 (2006) 
(“[F]eeding prisoners the absolute bare minimum creates an atmosphere of distrust 
and suspicion among [the prisoners], making them fight each other for extra scraps of 
food and the clothing of those who have died.”); Martin, supra note 37, at 567 
(discussing the extremely small meal rations and stating that a former North Korean 
labor camp prisoner believed that “in a state-operated prison camp, I guess the 
authorities try to keep the prisoners eating barely enough to sustain life”); WITNESS TO 
THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 97 (showing that many North Korean 
detainees witnessed forced starvation within the prison camps). 
83. See Cammarota, supra note 57, at 18 (explaining how North Korean prison 
inmates supplement their diets in order to survive); HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 
207. 
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malnourished and ill equipped for extreme working conditions, 
many prison inmates exhibit physical deformities, such as 
emaciated physiques, hunched backs, and missing limbs. 84 
Electric shock, rape, water torture, forcing prisoners to severely 
beat up on one another, medical experimentation, forced 
abortions, and infanticide are some methods of punishment 
used within the North Korean penal camps.85 One HRNK report 
revealed that inmates caught attempting to escape were publicly 
executed and guards often forced other prisoners to participate 
in the execution.86 
Moreover, state-perpetuated gender-based violence, often 
propelled by racially motivated discrimination, is commonplace 
in the North Korean penal system.87 Former prisoners reported 
that guards perform abortions by kicking a woman in the 
stomach, pinning a pregnant woman to the ground and 
jumping directly onto her stomach, placing wooden planks on 
top of the mother’s stomach and forcing male prisoners to jump 
up and down on the plank, and injecting women’s wombs with 
concentrations of the drug ravenol.88 Others have witnessed 
guards commit infanticides by wrapping several premature 
babies in newspaper and burying them alive, beating infants to 
                                                                                                             
84. See HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 207 (describing detainees as “walking 
skeletons”); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 28 (“Many prisoners are stunted and deformed 
from back-breaking work, twelve hours a day, seven days a week . . . .”); LIVES AND 
VOICES, supra note 1, at 31 (describing physical harm to prisoners caused by the 
conditions of North Korean penal camps). 
85. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPS. ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
2008, S. PRT. 111-60, at 865 (2d Sess. 2010) (“Defectors continued to report that many 
prisoners died from torture, disease, [and] starvation . . . .”); Cammarota, supra note 
57, at 16, 22 (describing North Korean prison camp punishment techniques); LIVES 
AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 4, 33, 94–5, 124, 126, 142, 152–54 (discussing the harsh 
punishments imposed for relatively minor rule infractions); WITNESS TO THE 
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 96–97. 
86. Cammarota, supra note 57, at 18; see LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 33 
(discussing an instance where prison guards forced other prisoners to participate in the 
public execution of another prisoner). 
87. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 122–23 (discussing racially motivated 
gender-based violence inside North Korean prison camps); see also CITIZENS’ ALLIANCE 
FOR NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS, THE BATTERED WHEEL OF THE REVOLUTION: 
BRIEFING REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST NORTH KOREAN WOMEN 
50–54 (2011) (discussing State perpetuated gender-based violence in North Korean 
prison camps). 
88. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 94, 152–54 for first-hand testimony by 
former inmates; see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 22, at 23–24. 
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death, using forceps to stab newborns in the skull, and throwing 
newborn infants into plastic boxes and leaving them to die.89 
B. North Korea in the International Spotlight: The Great Famine of the 
1990s and the Kim Family Dynasty 
Despite North Korea’s isolationist policies under Juche 
thought, the nation has found itself increasingly entwined in 
foreign relations.90 Economic collapse and successive natural 
disasters have necessarily required foreign aid. 91  Moreover, 
North Korea’s recent militant threats and unpredictable 
behavior have called for heightened international intervention 
and involvement.92 
                                                                                                             
89. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 4, 124, 126, 152–53 for first-hand 
testimony by former inmates; see also James Brooke, N. Koreans Talk of Baby Killings, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 10, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/10/world/n-korean s-talk-
of-baby-killings.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
90. See, e.g., STEPHAN HAGGARD, MARCUS NOLAND, & ERIK WEEKS, NORTH KOREA 
ON THE PRECIPICE OF FAMINE 3 (2008) [hereinafter NORTH KOREA ON THE PRECIPICE 
OF FAMINE] (“North Korea is critically dependent at the margin on external sources of 
supply . . . [and North Korea’s] pursuit of self-sufficiency has always been 
fundamentally misguided.”); HELGA TURKU, ISOLATIONIST STATES IN AN 
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 74, 122–23 (2009) (recognizing North Korea’s isolationist 
policies, but also observing that North Korea had received “substantial humanitarian 
aid” from the European Union, negotiated with the United States, South Korea, and 
Japan “to receive up to half a million tons” of fuel, and attempted to “normalize 
[international] relations” by “promising a range of changes in exchange for aid and 
international recognition”); see also HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 250 (noting North 
Korea’s “policy of isolation”); OFFICIAL DPRK: JUCHE, supra note 46 (emphasizing on 
the North Korean official website the importance of political and economic self-
reliance and independence under the Juche ideology). 
91. See MARK E. MANYIN & MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40095, 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO NORTH KOREA 2–3 (2012) (discussing a United States 
humanitarian aid program provided to North Korea from 1995 to 2003 and stating that 
it was reinstated in 2007); North Korea Blames Global Warming for Natural Disasters, 
RELIEFWEB (Aug. 21, 2002), http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-
korea/north-korea-blames-global-warming-natural-disasters (reporting on the repeated 
natural disasters beginning in the 1990s); HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1 (discussing the 
subsequent collapse of North Korea’s economy following the mid 1990s famine); 
NORTH KOREA ON THE PRECIPICE OF FAMINE, supra note 90 (noting North Korea’s 
“critical dependence” on foreign aid). 
92. See Press Release, Bureau of Int’l Sec. & Nonproliferation, United States 
Sanctions Individuals Linked to North Korean Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs 
(Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/205879.htm (last visited Mar. 
31, 2013) (discussing UN Security Council sanctions imposed on North Korea in 2006, 
2009, and 2013 following three missile and nuclear tests in each of the respective 
years); Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, US, China Agree on UN Sanctions Draft on 
North Korea, NBCNEWS (Mar. 5, 2013, 6:30 PM), http://worldnews.nbcne ws.com/
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1. The Great Famine in North Korea 
During the 1990s, large numbers of individuals crossed 
North Korean borders into China to flee a persistent and deadly 
famine.93 The mid-1990s national food crisis was partly caused by 
structural issues starting in the early 1980s with North Korea’s 
food rationing system, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union 
that caused North Korea to lose forty percent of all its imports, 
decline in trade with China following normalization of Sino-
South Korean relations in the early 1990s, and successive 
calamitous natural disasters in North Korea between 1994 and 
1997.94 North Korea’s Great Famine, which resulted in a death 
toll of massive scale, is recognized to be one of the worst famines 
of the twentieth century.95 
Numerical estimates of the total deaths caused by the Great 
Famine vary greatly.96 While North Korean officials contend that 
                                                                                                             
_news/2013/03/05/17194138-us-china-agree-on-un-sanctions-draft-on-north-korea?lite 
(reporting that “the United States and China reached a deal that ‘significantly 
expands’ U.N. sanctions on North Korea for its third nuclear test”). 
93 . See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-691, HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE: STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND ASYLUM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2010) (stating that famine in North Korea in the 1990s “compelled a 
large number . . . to leave”); RÜDIGER FRANK, KOREA 2010: POLITICS, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 161 (2010); North Korea ‘Loses 3 Million to Famine,’ BRITISH BROADCASTING 
CORP. (Feb. 17, 1999, 11:20 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/281132.stm 
[hereinafter North Korea Loses 3 Million] (reporting on the estimated massive death toll 
resulting from the North Korean famine of the mid 1990s). 
94. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STARVED OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
FOOD CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (NORTH KOREA) 6 
(2004) [hereinafter STARVED OF RIGHTS] (discussing the causes of the Great Famine in 
North Korea); STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARCUS NOLAND, HUNGER AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
POLITICS OF FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA 14 (2005) [hereinafter POLITICS OF FAMINE IN 
NORTH KOREA] (discussing the collapse of North Korea’s Public Distribution System in 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s); KOREA: THE EAST ASIAN PIVOT 124 (Jonathan D. 
Pollack ed., 2004) (stating that the “fall in imports [to North Korea] from Russia in 
1991 was equivalent to 40 percent of all [North Korean] imports” and that “a 
disillusioned China reduced its exports to North Korea,” which it claims to be “the 
single proximate trigger to the North Korean famine”). 
95. See LEE ALLYN DAVIS, NATURAL DISASTERS 130 (2008) (stating that the North 
Korean famine of the 1990s was “one of the worst famines of modern times”); FAMINE 
IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the 
North Korean famine in the 1990s as ranking “among the most destructive of the 
twentieth century”); Manyin, supra note 91, at 13 (“A severe famine in the mid-1990s 
killed an estimated 600,000 to 3 million North Koreans.”). 
96. See SUK LEE, THE GREAT FAMINE OF 1994-2000: EXISTENCE AND IMPACT 21 
(2005) (discussing the greatly differing numerical estimates of the total deaths 
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the Great Famine claimed a total of 220,000 lives between 1995 
and 1998, the US House of Representatives’ International 
Relations Committee estimates that 300,000 to 800,000 people 
died per year, totaling 900,000 to 2.4 million famine deaths.97 In 
contrast to Western reports, South Korean officials revealed a 
lower figure of 270,000 total famine casualties between 1995 and 
1998.98 Further, some research institutes and notable experts 
calculate an approximate range of 600,000 to 1 million Great 
Famine fatalities.99 
The food shortages, mass starvation, disease, and deaths 
that began with the Great Famine lingered on well after 1998 
and into the 2000s, forcing North Korea to continue to rely 
heavily on foreign aid.100 Still today, the nation has yet to fully 
                                                                                                             
resulting from the Great Famine); see also POLITICS OF FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA, supra 
note 95, at 9. 
97. See Andrew Natsios, The Dangers of the Coming North Korean Famine, U.S. NEWS 
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/11/12/
the-political-consequences-of-famine-in-north-korea (stating that as many as 2.5 million 
people were killed from famine during the Great Famine of the 1990s); Jeffries, supra 
note 58, at 452 (discussing North Korea’s contention that a total of 220,000 people 
died between 1995 and 1998 from famine); see also Henry Chu, U.S. Officials Report 
Horror of N. Korea Famine, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/20/news/mn-14860 (stating, in 1998, that US 
officials reported that 300,000 to 800,000 North Koreans died each year starting in 
1995); FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA: MARKETS, AID, AND REFORM, supra note 1, at 73 
(stating that the North Korean government estimated a total 220,000 Great Famine 
deaths between 1995 and 1998); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 58 (discussing the US House 
of Representatives’ International Relations Committee’s estimate that 300,000 to 
800,000 North Koreans died each year between 1995 and 1998). 
98. See Lee Soo-Jeong, 270,000 North Koreans Have Died From Famine, Says South, 
RELIEFWEB (Aug. 27, 1999), http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-
korea/270000-north-koreans-have-died-famine-says-south (reporting South Korea’s 
official estimate of 270,000 total Great Famine deaths); Report: 270,000 North Koreans 
Killed by Famine From 1995 to 1998, AMARILLO (Aug. 27, 1999), http://amarillo.com/
stories/082799/usn_LA0783.001.shtml (reporting on South Korea’s official estimate of 
total North Korean famine casualties between 1995 and 1998). 
99. See KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 77, at 345 (providing KINU’s estimate 
of 580,000 to 1,120,000 total deaths from the Great Famine); POLITICS OF FAMINE, supra 
note 94, at 18 (providing Stephan Haggard’s and Marcus Noland’s belief that more 
“plausible” studies by analysts “suggest between 600,000 and 1 million excess deaths”); 
Suk Lee, supra note 96, at 46–47 (providing the analysis used to determine the 
estimated 600,000 to 1 million famine death toll range); see also A MATTER OF SURVIVAL, 
supra note 52, at 9 (stating that “demographic and economic experts use one million as 
a reasonable estimate” of North Korea’s Great Famine). 
100. See KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 100, at 335 (explaining that, 
although foreign aid to North Korea and grain production increased in 2000 and 2001, 
respectively, “chronic food shortages within North Korea persisted”); MANYIN & 
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recover.101 In 2012, Japanese and South Korean media reported 
that a large-scale famine in North Korea had resurfaced, though 
to what extent remains speculative.102  
2. North Korean President Kim Jong-un 
On December 17, 2011, enigmatic supreme leader Kim 
Jong-il died of a heart attack at sixty-nine years of age, officially 
ending his seventeen-year reign over North Korea. 103 
Immediately following his passing, Kim’s youngest son and 
designated heir to the dynastic regime, Kim Jong-un, presided as 
North Korea’s new supreme leader.104 Since the leadership shift, 
                                                                                                             
NIKITIN, supra note 91, at 13 (explaining that the United States provided North Korea 
with food aid from 1995 to 2003, which resumed again in 2007); POLITICS OF FAMINE IN 
NORTH KOREA, supra note 94, at 15 (illustrating a chart showing North Korean food 
imports and aids from 1990 to 2003). 
101. See Korea, Democratic People’s Republic (DPRK), WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 
http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2012) (“In July 2012, WFP resumed its ‘Nutrition Support to Women and 
Children in the [DPRK]’ operation, which seeks to combat continued hunger and 
under-nutrition among children and their mothers . . .  .”); MANYIN & NIKITIN, supra 
note 91, at 13 (“Since 1995, the international community has donated over 12 million 
MT of food aid to North Korea to help North Korea alleviate chronic, massive food 
shortages that began in the early 1990s.”); POLITICS OF FAMINE IN NORTH KOREA, supra 
note 100 (demonstrating that foreign food imports to North Korea continued into the 
2000s). 
102. See Aid Worker Says North Korea May Be Facing New Food Crisis, ASAHI SHIMBUN 
(Osaka), Aug. 30, 2012, http://ajw.asah i.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/
AJ201208300106 (“North Korea could be heading towards a crisis similar to the 1990s 
when a million people are thought to have died . . . .”); N. Korean Famine ‘Worst in Over 
20 Years,’ CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Oct. 15, 2012, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2012/10/15/2012101501435.html; N. Korean Farmer Cites Grave Drought; Aid 
Unlikely, Korea Herald (Seoul) (May 29, 2012, 8:02 PM), 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20120529000957; Report: Famine Hit 
N.Korea’s Rice Basket in 2012, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Osaka) (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/korean_peninsula/AJ201302070094. 
103. Kim Jong Il Passes Away, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Pyongyang) (Dec. 
19, 2011), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201112/news19/20111219-02ee.html 
(announcing to North Korean citizens Kim Jong-il’s passing); see Medical Analysis of Kim 
Jong Il’s Demise, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (Pyongyang) (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2011/201112/news19/20111219-03ee.html (reporting 
that the cause of Kim Jong-il’s death was a heart attack); see also North Korean Leader Kim 
Jong-il Dies ‘of Heart Attack’, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP.(Dec. 19, 2011, 7:53AM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16239693. 
104. Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK (“KCNA”) is a state-run news 
agency and North Korea’s only news agency provided to North Korean citizens. NORTH 
KOREA HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 416; see also JAMES E. HOARE, HISTORICAL 
DICTIONARY OF DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 231 (2012). Notice to All 
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Kim Jong-un’s regime has kept the world on its toes by 
developing its nuclear proliferation programs, reneging on the 
1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, declaring a “state of war” 
with South Korea, and threatening the United States with 
ballistic missile attacks.105 While the global community’s focus 
remained on North Korea’s militaristic and unconventional 
tactics, North Korea’s treatment of its own citizens worsened; the 
brutality of punishments for attempted border crossing 
surpassed what was observed during Kim Jong-il’s rule. 106 
                                                                                                             
Party Members, supra note 41 (revealing on the same day of announcing Kim Jong-il’s 
death that Kim Jong-un had succeeded leadership over North Korea, and describing 
Kim Jong-un as the “great successor to the revolutionary cause of Juche and 
outstanding leader of our party, army and people); see Holly Yan & Atika Shubert, Kim 
Jong Un: The ‘Great Successor’ Remains an Enigma, CNN (Dec. 19, 2011, 11:32 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/19/world/asia/kim-jong-un-profile; see also Liu Ming, 
Changes and Continuities in Pyongyang’s China Policy, in NORTH KOREA IN TRANSITION: 
POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 211 (Kyung-Ae Park & Scott Snyder eds., 2013) 
(stating that during a North Korean party conference, Kim Jong-un was informally 
designated as Kim Jong-il’s heir apparent); Kongdan Oh & Ralph Hassig, North Korea in 
2009: The Song Remains the Same, 50 ASIAN SURVEY 89, 96 (2010) (describing Kim Jong-
un as Kim Jong-il’s youngest son); HIDDEN PEOPLE, supra note 1, at 2 (describing North 
Korea as a “dynastic dictatorship”). 
105. The 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement was a truce signed between North 
Korea and the People’s Republic of Korea (South Korea) to enforce a cease-fire. 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, OUR DOCUMENTS: 100 MILESTONE DOCUMENTS FROM THE 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES 204 (2003). The Korean Armistice Agreement is not a peace treaty 
and North Korea and South Korea are technically still at war. Id.; MARITIME 
CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES IN ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY 13 (Joshua 
Ho et al. eds., 2013); see, e.g., Masamito Aoki & Mizuho Aoki, Defiant North Korea 
Launches Rocket, JAPAN TIMES (Minato) (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2012/12/13/national/defiant-north-korea-launches-rocket/#.UVe20qv5lcM 
(reporting on North Korea’s December 2012 rocket launch into the Earth’s orbit); 
North Korea Says It Is in a ‘State of War’ with South, GUARDIAN (London) (Mar. 29, 2013, 
9:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2 013/mar/30/north-korea-state-war-
south-korea (reporting on North Korea declaring a “state of war” with South Korea); 
N.Korea: ‘Time Has Come to Settle Accounts’ with United States, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul), Mar. 
30, 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/03/30/20130330
00343. html (covering North Korea’s March 2013 threats of missile attacks on the 
United States); North Korea Conducted an Underground Nuclear Test; South Korea on High 
Alert, HAARETZ (Tel Aviv) (Feb. 12, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/
world/north-korea-conducted-an-underground-nuclear-test-south-korea-on-high-alert-
1.503002 (reporting on North Korea’s February 2013 underground nuclear test); Rocket 
Launch Fails, North Korea Eyes N-Test, TIMES OF INDIA (Mumbai)(Apr. 14, 2012, 2:38 
AM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-04-14/rest-of-world/31341715_
1_long-range-rocket-north-korea-founding-president-kim-il-sung (detailing North 
Korea’s failed April 2012 attempted missile launch). 
106. See KINU WHITE PAPER 2012, supra note 99, at 525 (“It has further been 
reported that the persecution of defector families has become worse since Kim Jong-un 
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Foreign media reported that North Korean border officials were 
now equipped with orders to “shoot-to-kill” attempted border-
crossers, that punishments for repatriated North Koreans and 
their families had increased in severity, and that North Korean 
prison camps and prison guards had expanded in size and 
numbers.107 
C. The Enduring Kinship: The PRC-DPRK Alliance and Its 
Implications for North Korean Migrants in China 
For more than a half-century, North Korea has enjoyed a 
unique kinship with the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 
the isolated nation’s most important ally.108 Political scientists 
recognize the PRC-DPRK alliance as one-sided, noting that 
“China makes all the sacrifices—providing crucial political and 
diplomatic backing, essential economic assistance, and limited 
military cooperation.” 109  While relations have not been 
                                                                                                             
emerged as the successor to Kim Jong-il.”); North Korea’s Kim Jong Un Wages Defector 
Crackdown, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 2012, 4:00 AM, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
world_now/2012/01/kim-jong-il-death-new-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un-
crackdown-on-defectors.html (claiming that Kim Jong-un has instructed North Korean 
border authorities to “shoot-to-kill” North Korean border crossers); see also Lee Jong-
Heon, Kim Jong-Un Era Starts with New Landmines on China Border and Shoot-to-Kill Orders 
to Stop Defections, WORLDTRIBUNE.COM (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.worldtribune.com/
2012/02/02/kim-jong-un-era-starts-with-new-landmines-on-china-border-and-shoot-to-
kill-orders-to-stop-defections; Sharp Drop in North Korea Refugees to South, INQUIRER 
(Makati City), Jan. 2, 2013, 3:11 PM, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/333847/sharp-drop-
in-north-korea-refugees-to-south. 
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (providing several media news 
sources reporting on Kim Jong-un’s policy to “shoot-to-kill” North Koreans at North 
Korean borders); see also Philip Bump, Satellites Show North Korea’s Prison Camps 
Expanding Under Kim Jong-Un, ATLANTIC WIRE (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/02/north-korea-prison-camp-
satellites/62514/ (reporting that North Korean prison camps have grown in size and 
that the number of prison guards in camps has doubled). 
108. See ANDREW SCOBELL, CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: FROM COMRADES-IN-ARMS 
TO ALLIES AT ARM’S LENGTH iii, 1 (2004) [hereinafter COMRADES-IN-ARMS] (noting the 
Korean War in the 1950s as the start of the Peoples Republic of China-Democratic 
Peoples Republic of Korea (“PRC-DPRK”) alliance and describing the relationship as 
“strange” to outsiders); Alexander Zhebin, A Political History of Soviet-North Korean 
Nuclear Cooperation, in THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: SECURITY, STRATEGY 
AND NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM RUSSIA 35 (James Moltz Clay et al. eds., 2011) (describing 
China as North Korea’s “last major ally” and its position to North Korea as “unique”). 
109 . COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 4 (describing the PRC-DPRK 
relationship as “one-sided”); see SAMUEL S. KIM, NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 
THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 8 (2007) (“Without a doubt, China holds greater 
2013] FATE OF THE STATELESS N. KOREAN MIGRANT 201 
consistently friendly, China has never abandoned the PRC-
DPRK alliance. 110  Observers rationalize the dynamic and 
intimate relationship by pointing to common socialist 
ideological views, logical geopolitical strategy, and the negative 
implications for China if the North Korean regime were to 
collapse.111 
First, China and North Korea have a common, long-
enduring “ideological bond” through their Communist 
regimes.112 Since the Korean War and through the Cold War, 
China and North Korea have fought side-by-side as allies against 
foreign nations they view as “common ideological enemies,” 
such as the United States and South Korea.113 Second, North 
Korea is an important geopolitical security interest to China.114 
                                                                                                             
importance in North Korea’s foreign policy than the DPRK holds in Chinese foreign 
policy.”). 
110 . See RETHINKING FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS: STATES, LEADERS, AND THE 
BEHAVIOR OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 100–01 (Stephen G. Walker et al. eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter RETHINKING FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS] (stating “China-North Korea 
relations were at odds in the early 1990s” because of China’s newfound diplomatic 
relations with South Korea, but that “strategically, China never abandoned North 
Korea”); SCOTT SNYDER, CHINA’S RISE AND THE TWO KOREAS 130 (2009) (discussing 
“[t]he political estrangement between China and North Korea that followed China’s 
decision to normalize diplomatic relations with South Korea” in the 1990s). 
111. See ALICE MILLER ET AL., BECOMING ASIA: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN ASIAN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 265 (2011) (stating that China 
wants to prevent the North Korean regime from collapsing to avoid mass migration and 
“a loss of North Korea as a buffer zone”); COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 1 
(naming shared socialist political ideology and geopolitical balance as the “logic of the 
relationship between the PRC and DPRK”). 
112. RUSSELL ONG, CHINA’S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 76–77 
(2007) (noting that “China and North Korea are currently among the few Communist 
regimes left in the world” and share an “ideological bond . . . against the US”); see 
COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 1 (“As fraternal socialist party-states, Beijing and 
Pyongyang share an ideological affinity.”). 
113. See HANKWON KIM, CULTURAL AND STATE NATIONALISM: SOUTH KOREAN AND 
JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH CHINA 137 (2007) (“Although the Korean War ended in 
1953, a Cold War-regional balance of power established between the U.S.-Japan-South 
Korea side and the Soviet Union-China-North Korea side.”); ONG, supra note 112, at 77 
(“Both [China and North Korea] also continue to stress the common need to preserve 
the ruling authoritarian parties’ hold on power by defeating the US-led strategy of 
peaceful evolution . . . . [T]his strategy aims to undermine Communist regimes 
through non-military means . . . .”); COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 1–2 
(describing China and North Korea as becoming “brothers-in-arms” starting in the 
Korean War and that, in 1961, China and North Korea signed a friendship treaty “that 
committed one country to come to the aid of the other if attacked). 
114. See COMRADES-IN-ARMS, supra note 108, at 3 (discussing the geopolitics of the 
PRC-DPRK alliance); see also NORTH KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 182 (Eun Kwan 
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The two Communist nations share an 850-mile border, with 
North Korea serving as an important “buffer state” from US or 
South Korean encroachment into China. 115  Third, China 
understands that without its economic and political backing, the 
North Korean regime’s survival is unlikely.116 China postulates 
that a collapse of the North Korean regime may facilitate a 
resurgence of the Korean War or a mass North Korean exodus 
into China.117 Lastly, though PRC-DPRK relations appear to have 
cooled following North Korea’s bellicose actions in 2012 and 
2013, China has continued to support the State’s policies 
prohibiting North Korean citizens from straying outside North 
Korea’s control.118 
                                                                                                             
Choi et al. eds., 2003) (stating that “China currently seems to prefer a divided Korean 
Peninsula with North Korea as a buffer between South Korea and US troops”). 
115. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (stating that North Korea serves as 
a “buffer” zone to China preventing US and South Korean encroachment); MILLER ET 
AL., supra note 111 (noting China’s concern that if it loses North Korea as a “buffer 
zone” it will result in the “expansion of the American presence to China’s borders”). 
116. See ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINESE FOREIGN RELATIONS: POWER AND POLICY 
SINCE THE COLD WAR 204 (“[P]revailing Chinese government actions still seemed to 
strike a balance of support and accommodation of the North Korean regime, which 
China seeking to avoid the many dangers for its key interests that would follow from 
major instability or collapse of the North Korean regime.”); see also supra note 110 and 
accompanying text (stating that China provides “crucial” political, economic, and 
military support to North Korea). 
117. See MELANIE KIRKPATRICK, ESCAPE FROM NORTH KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY 
OF ASIA’S UNDERGROUND RAILROAD 306 (2012) (“A collapse of North Korea would 
have huge implications for China: disruption of regional trade, refugees streaming 
across its border, even war.”); SUTTER, supra note 116 (“Chinese leaders showed keen 
awareness that major instability in or collapse of the North Korean regime would have 
potentially serious adverse consequences . . . includ[ing] the danger of full-scale war on 
the Korean peninsula and large-scale refugee flows to China.”). 
118. See Roberta Cohen, China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees, BROOKINGS 
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/03/05-china-
repatriation-cohen (stating in a testimony submitted to the US Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China that China was planning on repatriating thirty to forty North 
Koreans pursuant to a bilateral agreement with North Korea); Jennifer Lind, Will China 
Finally ‘Bite’ North Korea?, CNN (Mar. 14, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/
03/11/opinion/lind-north-korea (discussing how China agreed to UN sanctions 
against North Korea, but also why China remains an ally to North Korea); Paula 
Hancocks, China Has Repatriated North Korean Defectors, South Korean Official Says, CNN 
(Mar. 9, 2012, 11:39 AM) http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/09/world/asia/china-north-
korea (“Ignoring international protests, China may have repatriated around 30 North 
Korean defectors[,] . . . a South Korean official said Friday.”); Jane Perlez, Chinese 
Editor Suspended for Article on North Korea, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/world/asia/chinese-suspend-editor-who-
questioned-north-korea-alliance.html?_r =0 (reporting on a claim by Deng Yuwen, the 
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1. China’s Repatriation Policy: China’s Policy of Automatically 
Repatriating All North Korean Migrants 
Since the 1990s, China observed a considerable influx of 
North Korean migrants, primarily into the northeastern 
provinces situated along the Sino-North Korean border.119 A 
large ethnic Korean population and the geographic proximity of 
the provinces make for a convenient stop for the North Korean 
migrants. 120  China alleges that about 10,000 North Korean 
migrants reside within its borders.121  South Korea, however, 
estimates about 10,000 to 30,000 migrants are in China, while 
other NGOs estimate the population to be between 100,000 and 
300,000 North Korean migrants.122 
                                                                                                             
author of an article published in a British paper, that the Chinese Communist Party 
suspended him “after writing an article . . . saying that China should abandon its ally 
North Korea”). 
119. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 3 (“[T]he collapse of the North 
Korean economy in the 1990s . . . provoked the greatest outpouring—starvation and 
despair prompting hundreds of thousands to seek help across the [Chinese] border.”); 
LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 111 (“The largest number of North Korean ‘border 
crossers’ were people simply seeking to survive . . . particularly during the acute famine 
in the 1990s.”); LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 11 (“In the mid-to-late 1990s, large 
numbers of North Koreans began crossing into China as North Korea slipped into 
famine and North Korea’s control began to fray, particularly in the northeastern 
provinces bordering China.”); see also CAMMAROTA ET AL., supra note 57, at 11. 
120. See LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 17, 19 (discussing the large ethnic 
Korean population in China’s northeastern provinces and that “[t]he presence of 
culturally similar, linguistically connected populations on the other side of the border 
offers an advantage to the refugees”); see also Frank, supra note 93, at 265 (“In sum, 
geographical proximity to the Sino-Korean border seems to be the dominant 
explanation for the large share of migrants . . . .”); CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, 
supra note 56, at 4–6. 
121. See Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 139 (“The Chinese government 
estimates the number of North Korean defectors residing in China to be about 
10,000.”); see also DORIS WASTL-WALTER, THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO 
BORDER STUDIES 508 (2011). 
122 . Compare CAREN FREEMAN, MAKING AND FAKING KINSHIP: MARRIAGE AND 
LABOR MIGRATION BETWEEN CHINA AND SOUTH KOREA 98 (2011) (noting the South 
Korean government’s “conservative estimate of 10,000-30,000”), and INVISIBLE EXODUS, 
supra note 21, at 2 (describing South Korea’s Ministry of Unification in the Republic of 
Korea’s estimate of 10,000 North Korean migrants currently in China as a low estimate 
relative to non-governmental organizations’ estimates), and Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 
32, at 139, with VICTOR CHA, THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE: NORTH KOREA, PAST AND FUTURE 
197 (2012) (stating that other governments and organizations estimate about 100,000 
to 300,000 North Korean migrants are in China), and INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, 
at 2 (noting that “as many as 300,000 [is] estimated by non-governmental groups”), and 
WASTL-WALTER, supra note 121 (stating that other organizations have estimated that 
about 150,000 to 300,000 North Korean migrants are within Chinese borders). 
204 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:175 
China practices the policy of forcibly deporting all 
unauthorized migrants to North Korea. 123  China justifies 
repatriating the migrants under two theories.124 First, China 
claims that all North Koreans in China are “economic 
migrants.”125 This sweeping classification systematically excludes 
all North Korean migrants in China from the Refugee 
Convention’s reach.126 Second, China asserts that it must honor 
the Mutual Cooperative Protocol Between China and North 
Korea for National Security and Social Order in the Border 
Areas (the “Repatriation Treaty”), a PRC-DPRK bilateral 
treaty.127 When it entered the 1986 agreement, China promised 
to repatriate all North Korean migrants who unlawfully crossed 
the Sino-North Korean border. 128  As a result of China’s 
repatriation policy, North Koreans are viewed as illegal 
                                                                                                             
123. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that 
China generally denies North Koreans the opportunity to apply for political asylum and 
that China maintains that it must repatriate North Korean migrants in China under the 
bilateral treaty with North Korea); see also China’s Repatriation of North Korean Refugees: 
Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 112th Cong. 2 (2d Sess. 2012) 
[hereinafter Hearing: China’s Repatriation] (statement of Chris Smith, Chairman, Cong.-
Exec. Comm’n on China). 
124. See Yeo Hoon Julie Park, Note, China’s “Way Out” of the North Korean Refugee 
Crisis: Developing a Legal Framework for the Deportation of North Korean Migrants, 25 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 516, 521 (2011) (explaining that China’s “economic migrant” 
categorization of North Korean migrants and a PRC-DPRK bilateral treaty justify its 
policy to repatriate North Korean migrants); Gahng, supra note 23, at 361. 
125 . See CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 32 (“The Chinese 
government . . . continues to deport North Korean refugees under the classification of 
‘economic migrants . . . .’”); Gahng, supra note 23, at 372 (“As illegal economic 
migrants, undocumented North Koreans are subject to being captured, detained, and 
beaten by Chinese law enforcement.”). 
126. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing China’s continued 
practice of repatriating North Korean migrants); see also Greenhill, supra note 33. 
127. See Repatriation Treaty, supra note 27; see also Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, 
at 139 (explaining that in the 1960’s, China secretly entered into the Escaped Criminals 
Reciprocal Extradition with North Korea, and then in 1986, it entered into the Mutual 
Cooperative Protocol Between China and North Korea for National Security and Social 
Order in the Border Areas, promising North Korea to repatriate all unauthorized 
North Koreans); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 11 n. 24. 
128. See Repatriation Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 3–5, 10 (outlining China’s duties 
to North Korea and demonstrating that China entered into the agreement with North 
Korea in 1986); see also CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (“China 
indicates it is obliged under a bilateral 1986 repatriation agreement with North Korea 
to return all border crossers.”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 11; supra note 26 
and accompanying text (outlining North Korean laws prohibiting the crossing of the 
North Korean borders without State authorization). 
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immigrants and are steadfastly denied institutional 
humanitarian aid.129 
Each year, China repatriates approximately 5,000 to 6,000 
North Korean migrants. 130  The KINU reported that China 
repatriated upwards of 15,000 migrants in June 2000 alone.131 
Yet, many migrants have no desire to reside in China 
permanently. 132  Many migrants use China for temporary 
transitional purposes to gain entry into other countries, namely 
South Korea.133 
After successfully crossing Sino-North Korean borders, 
North Korean migrants continue to live in perpetual fear of 
repatriation.134 In addition to risks of forcible deportation, the 
migrants are also susceptible to manipulation and mistreatment 
by residents in China.135 Since North Koreans in China are 
                                                                                                             
129. See DICK K. NANTO ET AL., CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS 5 [hereinafter 
CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS] (explaining that because China views North Korean 
migrants as “economic migrants,” it does not allow UN agencies or other NGOs access 
to North Korean migrants in China); CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 
9 (noting China’s “unwillingness to view illegal [North Korean] migrants as refugees”); 
see also LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 113; WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, 
supra note 65, at 149. 
130. See Hearing: China’s Repatriation, supra note 124, at 38 (“[I]t is estimated that 
more than 5,000 refugees are deported back to North Korea every year.”); China to 
Repatriate ‘Hundreds’ of N.Koreans, CHOSUN ILBO (Seoul) (Feb. 27, 2012, 12:08 PM), 
http://english.chosun.com/sit e/data/ html_dir/2012/02/27/2012022701242.html. 
131. KOR. INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
NORTH KOREA 2002, at 182 (2002); see also Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 140 
(discussing the US Committee for Refugees’ finding that in June 2000, China had 
repatriated 15,000 North Korean migrants). 
132. YOONOK CHANG, MIGRATION EXPERIENCES OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES: 
SURVEY EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 2 (2008) (“Relatively few refugees want to remain in 
China: Most want to permanently resettle in South Korea . . . .”); see, e.g., Cha, supra 
note 122, at 223 (noting that most North Korean defectors “choose to resettle in South 
Korea”); Jane Kim, supra note 32, at 463. 
133. YOONOK CHANG, supra note 132, at 8 (stating that most North Korean 
migrants do not wish to reside in China permanently and consider their time in China 
as a “‘transitional’ stay”); see also Jane Kim, supra note 32, at 463; WITNESS TO THE 
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 33. 
134. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 2 (“[T]he migrants remain hidden 
for fear of discovery, repatriation, and harsh punishment in North Korea.”); WITNESS 
TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 39 (“Approximately 67 percent identified 
fear of arrest and repatriation as their biggest concern.”). 
135. See WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 39 (stating that 
North Korean migrants feel extreme anxiety from their lack of legal status in China); 
see also Morse Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS. L.J. 
681, 700 (2010) (noting Chinese human traffickers’ exploitation of North Korean 
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compelled to remain in hiding to avoid detection, the migrants 
heavily depend on lawful residents for food and shelter.136 
Human traffickers exploit this vulnerability and the majority of 
North Korean women and children are sold into the Chinese 
bride and sex industry.137 Studies suggest that between seventy to 
over ninety percent of all North Korean women in China fall 
victim to the Chinese human trafficking trade.138 
2. China’s Repatriation Policy: China’s Policy of Refusing the 
United Nations and NGOs Access to North Korean Migrants 
Consistent with its repatriation policy, China restricts third-
party access to North Korean migrants, a scheme predicated on 
                                                                                                             
migrants in China); Gahng, supra note 23, at 367 (“[North Korean migrants] captured 
by Chinese officials were often beaten and deported.”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 
21, at 11–15 (detailing accounts of Chinese residents exploiting or mistreating North 
Korean migrants). 
136 . See WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 34 (“The 
overwhelming majority (88 percent) reported receiving help from the Korean-Chinese 
community directly, and three-quarters reported living with Korean-Chinese.”); see also 
Gahng, supra note 23, at 367 (“[Chinese] [o]fficials began actively prosecuting 
unauthorized migrants and subjected them to unprecedented levels of scrutiny and 
violence, forcing many to go into hiding.”); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 11–12 
(“Few refugees speak Chinese, and most rely on the assistance of ethnic Korean 
residents of China.”). 
137. N. Kor.: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges: Joint Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcomm. on the Int’l Terrorism, 
Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 10 (2d 
Sess. 2004) [hereinafter Hearing: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges] 
(statement of James A. Leach, Chairman, Subcomm. of Asia and the Pacific) (“Inside 
China, North Korean women and girls are particularly vulnerable to trafficking and 
sexual exploitation.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 115 (10th 
ed. 2010) (“The lack of access to UNHCR assistance and constant fear of forced 
repatriation by Chinese authorities leaves North Korean refugees more vulnerable to 
human traffickers.”); see also Kathleen Davis, Brides, Bruises and the Border: The 
Trafficking of North Korean Women into China, 26 SAIS REV. 131, 133 (“As North Korean 
women migrate into China . . . they are vulnerable to being trafficked as brides or 
women for the sex industry.”); LIVES FOR SALE, supra note 23, at 7 (“Although seeking 
opportunities in China, they instead become victims of traffickers and victims of men in 
China who paid traffickers to purchase a North Korean ‘wife.’”). 
138. Hearing: Human Rights, Refugees, and Humanitarian Challenges, supra note 137, 
at 76 (statement of Timothy A. Peters, Founder & Dir., Helping Hands/Kor.); see also 
Kim, supra note 32 (noting that seventy to eighty percent of North Korean women in 
China are trafficked); Tan, supra note 135 (stating that seventy to ninety percent of 
North Korean women in China become a victim to the Chinese trafficking trade). 
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the illegal migrant status of the North Koreans in China.139 At 
the local level, assisting North Korean migrants is unlawful in 
China.140 Residents discovered aiding or harboring the migrants 
risk persecution for violating Chinese law.141 With respect to the 
global community, China routinely bars UN agencies, NGOs, 
and other institutions from monitoring North Korean 
migrants. 142  The restrictive regulations prevent the United 
Nations from aiding migrants or screening North Koreans in 
China to determine their refugee status under international 
law.143 
Initially, China permitted the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (the “UNHCR”) to establish a full Branch Office in 
Beijing in 1995.144 During this time, while most of the individuals 
seeking the UNHCR’s aid were Vietnamese migrants, the 
                                                                                                             
139. See CHINA-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS, supra note 129 (discussing China’s view 
of North Korean migrants as “economic migrants” rather than “political refugees,” and 
therefore does not allow UN agencies or other non-governmental organizations access 
to North Korean migrants in China); WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, 
at 149 (explaining that China does not consider North Korean migrants as “refugees” 
under the Refugee Convention and how China’s steadfast refusal to view the migrants 
as refugees “has blocked an appropriate international response through the 
UNHCR”). 
140. See Ahn, supra note 28, at 311–12 (noting a Chinese law that “[prohibits] the 
harboring of undocumented migrants”); Carrinski, supra note 23, at 660; Leo, supra 
note 28 (“The government also reportedly arrested individuals who organized food, 
shelter, transportation, and other assistance to North Koreans.”) 
141. See Ahn, supra note 28, at 312 (detailing a claim in the US Federal Courts of 
Appeal by an individual who was persecuted by the Chinese government for harboring 
North Korean migrants in China); Carrinski, supra note 23, at 660; Leo, supra note 28 
(discussing the Chinese government’s actions against those discovered to have 
provided aid to North Korean migrants). 
142. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining how China does not 
permit third party organizations to aid North Korean migrants in China). 
143. See Carrinski, supra note 23, at 663 (“As of yet, China has not allowed the 
UNHCR to screen North Koreans for refugee status around the border region where 
most North Koreans live, despite UNHCR requests and pressure to do so.”); see also 
Ahn, supra note 28; Leo, supra note 28. 
144. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that in 
1995, China permitted the UNHCR to open a full Branch Office in Beijing). For the 
agreement the UNHCR attempted to enter into with China to have full, unimpeded 
access to all migrants in China seeking asylum, see Key Provisions of 1995 Treaty Between 
China and the UNHCR, LIFE FUNDS FOR NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES, 
http://www.northkoreanrefugees.com/unhcr-keyprovisions.html (last visited Nov. 28, 
2012) [hereinafter Key Provisions of 1995 Treaty]; see also About Us, UNHCR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html (last visited, Nov. 21) (providing a 
description of the UNHCR and its duties). 
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UNHCR managed to screen some North Korean migrants.145 
China soon discovered that the UNHCR had interviewed North 
Koreans and that the agency had determined that the migrants 
were refugees under international refugee law.146 Seeing the 
North Korean migrant problem as an internal matter, China 
vehemently opposed the UNHCR’s actions.147 Thereafter, China 
denied the UNHCR any further access to North Koreans.148 
Although China had once welcomed the UNHCR’s presence, 
the UNHCR now has “virtually no direct access” to North 
Koreans in China.149 Despite the UNHCR’s declaration in 2003 
that all North Korean defectors were “persons of concern,” it 
has had little success in changing current conditions.150  
China also actively thwarts the efforts of North Koreans to 
request refuge at foreign embassy compounds in China.151 In 
                                                                                                             
145. See JAMES D. SEYMOUR, CHINA: BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE SITUATION OF 
NORTH KOREANS IN CHINA 19–20 (2005) (“[In 1995], any refugee issues were 
comparatively minor, involving limited numbers of people mainly from Vietnam.”); 
CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (stating that the UNHCR had 
screened North Korean migrants in China and determined that they were refugees 
under the Refugee Convention); see also Cha, supra note 122, at 198. 
146. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10–11 (stating that 
China discovered the UNHCR had screened North Korean migrants and determined 
that they were refugees); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20. 
147. See SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20; see also CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, 
supra note 56, at 10–11 (stating that China saw the North Korean migrant problem as 
an internal matter”). 
148. See SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 19 (“[The UNHCR] is now seen as meddling 
in what China would prefer to keep as an internal or bilateral matter.”); see also CRS 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11. 
149. See SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20; see also CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, 
supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that after China’s discovery that the UNHCR had 
screened North Korean migrants, it prohibited the UNHCR’s direct access to the 
migrants thereafter). 
150 . See CONGR.-EXEC. COMM’N ON ON CHINA, 2005 ANNUAL REP.: NORTH 
KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA, 109TH CONG. 6 (1st Sess. 2005) [hereinafter CECC 
ANNUAL REPORT 2005] (finding that a “compelling case exists for recognizing North 
Koreans in China as refugees”); Hearing: China’s Repatriation, supra note 123, at 51 
(statement of Roberta Cohen, Non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst.) (“To 
UNHCR since 2004, North Koreans in China without permission are deemed ‘persons 
of concern,’ meriting humanitarian protection.”). 
151. See Benjamin Neaderland, Note, Quandary on the Yalu: International Law, 
Politics, and China’s North Korean Refugee Crisis, 40 STANFORD INT’L L.J. 143, 150 (2004) 
(detailing the Chinese government’s usage of barbed wires around embassy 
compounds and policemen actively checking for North Korean migrants in 
surrounding embassy areas to prevent the migrants from reaching the embassies); 
Carrinski, supra note 23, at 663 (stating that many North Korean migrants who have 
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2002, twenty-five North Korean migrants reached the Spanish 
Embassy in China and successfully negotiated their transfer to 
South Korea.152 Soon after, several more North Korean migrants 
began to rush towards unguarded embassy gates. 153  China 
reacted by heavily fortifying the surrounding areas of the 
embassies with policemen and barbed wire.154 At present, North 
Korean migrants apprehended at embassy gates are “dragged 
out of embassy compounds and repatriated to North Korea.”155 
II. CHINA’S REPATRIATION POLICY: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND EXAMINING CONFLICTING PRC-UN AND PRC-DPRK 
TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
Part II analyzes China’s incompatible obligations to the 
United Nations and to North Korea. First, Part II.A introduces 
the UN treaties and Chinese domestic law governing the rights 
of refugees and migrants at risk of subjection to torture if 
deported. Part II.B then explores the definitions of a “refugee,” 
“economic migrant,” and “refugee sur place” under 
international law. Lastly, Part II.C examines China’s conflicting 
treaty obligations and the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Part 
II.C also considers the last-in-time rule, a procedural custom in 
                                                                                                             
reached embassy compounds have been “caught and dragged out” and subsequently 
repatriated). 
152. Neaderland, supra note 151, at 150–51 (discussing the successful defection of 
the twenty-five North Korean migrants from China and the subsequent events following 
the event); see also North Koreans storm Spanish embassy, CNN World (Mar. 14, 2002, 
8:35 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-14/world/nkorea.spain.china.2130_1_
point-of-such-desperation-north-korean-refugees-spanish-embassy?_s=PM:asiapcf. 
153. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing the attempts of North 
Korean migrants to reach embassy compounds after the successful transfer of twenty-
five North Koreans to South Korea). 
154 . See Down to the Wire, THE ECONOMIST (London)(May 16, 2002), 
http://www.economist.com/node/1135535 (“The [Chinese] authorities have lately 
been scrambling to throw up barbed wire and other unsightly barriers around 
diplomatic installations, in order to slow the rising tide of North Koreans seeking 
political asylum by hopping fences and dashing through gates to foreign missions.”); 
INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 30; Neaderland, supra note 151, at 150. 
155. See Japan-China Spat Over North Koreans, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP. (May 
9, 2002, 8:19 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/197 6702.stm (reporting 
on an incident when China “forcibly removed two North Korean asylum seekers from a 
Japanese consulate in north-east China”); Mike Kim, supra note 58, at 110 (describing 
the story of a sixteen year old North Korea migrant and nine other North Koreans who 
attempted to reach a foreign embassy in China but were caught and repatriated to 
North Korea); see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at 663. 
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international law, and the effect on human rights treaties when 
enforcing the rule. 
A. The Refugee Convention, the CAT, and China’s Extradition Law: 
The Prohibition on the Refouleing of Refugees and Migrants Likely to 
be Subjected to Torture 
Cognizant of the millions of displaced individuals outside 
their home countries, the United Nations brought into force the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol (collectively the “Refugee Convention”), an 
international agreement regulating the legal rights of 
refugees.156 Through proffering its signature in 1982, China 
agreed to protect refugees within its borders.157 North Korea, 
however, is not a signatory.158 
Under the Refugee Convention, a “refugee” is “any person 
who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality.”159 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits 
contracting nations from repatriating, or the refouleing of, 
refugees inside their borders.160 This key non-refouler provision 
states, “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) 
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
                                                                                                             
156. See generally 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29; Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, art. 1 
(removing temporal and geographical limitations initially set in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention); UNHCR, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 
AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html 
(explaining that the 1951 Refugee Convention’s purpose was to protect the millions of 
refugees after World War I and World War II forced to resettle as a result of World War 
II, later amended and broadened by its 1967 Protocol). 
157. See U.N. Treaty Collection 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29 (naming 
China among one of the contracting parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention); U.N. 
Treaty Collection 1967 Protocol, supra note 29 (naming China as one of the signatories 
to the 1967 Protocol). 
158. See U.N. Treaty Collection 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29 (listing 
the contracting parties to the Refugee Convention); UN Treaty Collection 1967 
Protocol, supra note 29 (showing that North Korea is not a signatory to the 1967 
Protocol). 
159. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1. 
160 . See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33 (prohibiting the 
repatriation of refugees). 
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account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”161 
In 1984, the United Nations adopted the Refugee 
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.162  The CAT mandates 
member nations to protect individuals who are likely to be 
subjected to torture in a particular country.163 While North 
Korea is not a party to the CAT, China entered into the treaty in 
1986 and ratified it in 1988.164  
Like the Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the CAT contains 
a non-refouler clause, prohibiting member nations from 
refouleing persons “where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”165 The CAT defines “torture” as follows: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.166 
                                                                                                             
161. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33. 
162. CAT, supra note 36. 
163. See CAT, supra note 36 (prohibiting parties to the CAT from repatriating 
individuals, not limited to individuals with refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention, who are likely to face torture or inhuman treatment upon return to his or 
her home country); see also Richard P. Shafer, Construction and Application of United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, or 
Punishment, 184 A.L.R. FED. 385, 385 (2003) (“[The CAT] was enacted in order to 
make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”). 
164. See Status Table of Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. Treaty Collection CAT] (listing the state parties to the 
CAT). 
165. CAT, supra note 36, art. 3. 
166. CAT, supra note 36, art. 1. 
212 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:175 
To qualify as “torture,” the CAT requires four basic 
elements: (1) physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) suffered 
by a person; (3) by or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official; and (4) with the intent to inflict the pain or 
suffering for the listed purposes.167  
Domestically, China adopted language akin to the CAT in 
its Extradition Law of the People’s Republic of China (the 
“Extradition Law”).168 Article 8 of the Extradition Law, enacted 
in 2000, prohibits the extradition of persons who “[have] been 
or will probably be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or humiliating treatment or punishment.”169 In China’s periodic 
report to the United Nations’ Committee Against Torture, 
China affirmed that Article 8 “in essence transfer[red] the 
provisions in Article 3 of the [CAT] into domestic legal 
requirements, and [has] an important significance in respect of 
preventing subjects of extradition requests from being 
tortured.” 170  As follows, China must reject any requests for 
extradition if the individual will likely be subjected to torture in 
the requesting country.171 
B. The Refugee Convention: Legally Identifying North Korean 
Migrants 
To date, the Refugee Convention is the only universally 
binding instrument that affords protection to refugees. 172 
                                                                                                             
167. See id.; see also Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 149 (listing the elements of 
the CAT). 
168. See PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 for the text of China’s Extradition 
Law; see also U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Fourth Periodic Reps. of States Parties Due 
in 2004: China, pt. I, art. 2, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN/4 (June 27, 2007) 
[hereinafter U.N. CAT Report] (stating that the language in Article 8 in the 
Extradition Law was taken from Article 3 of the CAT). 
169. PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36, para 7. 
170. U.N. CAT Report, supra note 168. 
171 . See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text for the text of and a 
discussion on Article 8 of China’s Extradition Law. 
172. See UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status: Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 1, HCR/1P/ENG/REV. 3 (Dec. 2011) 
[hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] (stating in the UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, or the “UNHCR 
Handbook,” that “the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are ‘the central 
instruments underpinning the international refugee protection regime for sixty 
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Stipulated in the non-refoulement clause in Article 33, all 
contracting nations are prohibited from repatriating refugees.173 
Citing to the Refugee Convention, some critics question the 
legality of China’s treatment of North Korean migrants. 174 
Nonetheless, China argues that the migrants are not “refugees” 
as defined in the Refugee Convention, but rather are “economic 
migrants.”175 Thus, China maintains that its repatriation policy is 
not in contravention of international law.176 
1. “Economic Migrants” or “Refugees?” 
The UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (the “UNHCR 
Handbook”) defines an “economic migrant” as one who “is 
moved exclusively by economic considerations.”177 According to 
the UNHCR, “[economic migrants] choose to move in order to 
                                                                                                             
years’”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING: A FIELD MISSION MANUAL 432 (Anette 
Faye Jacobsen ed., 2008) (describing the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol as “the most important international sources related to refugee protection”); 
DORIS M. MEISSNER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION CHALLENGES IN A NEW ERA: A 
REP. TO THE TRILATERAL COMM’N 91 (1993) (explaining that the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol are “the only legally binding international 
instruments governing migration matters”); Erika Feller, The Evolution of the 
International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 131 (2001) (“The 
1951 Convention was the first, and indeed remains the only, binding refugee 
protection instrument of a universal character.”). 
173. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33 (non-refoulement 
provision). 
174. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DENIED STATUS, DENIED EDUCATION: CHILDREN 
OF NORTH KOREAN WOMEN IN CHINA 3 (2008) (arguing that China’s policy to 
repatriate all North Korean migrants is a violation of both domestic and international 
law); see also GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 32, para. 199 (listing China’s possible 
violations of international law with regard to its treatment of North Korean migrants). 
175. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10 (explaining that 
China views North Korean migrants as economic migrants, as opposed to political 
refugees); see also CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 32, at 127. 
176. See Joel R. Charny, North Koreans in China: A Human Rights Analysis, 13 INT’L 
J. KOREAN UNIFICATION STUD. 75, 81 (2004) (“In addition to insisting that all North 
Koreans are economic migrants, China also justifies its treatment of North Koreans by 
citing sovereign treaties with the DPRK . . . .”); supra note 175 and accompanying text 
(discussing China’s use of the “economic migrant” label to justify its repatriation policy 
with regards to North Korean migrants). 
177. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 15. The UNHCR Handbook provides 
the guidelines to assist in the interpretation of the Refugee Convention. Id. at 1. See 
Brush, supra note 23, at 39 (noting that the UNHCR provides that “economic 
migrants” differ from “refugees” in that they are outside their home countries for 
purely economic reasons); Gahng, supra note 23, at 372. 
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improve the future prospects of themselves” whereas “refugees” 
are forced “to move if they are to save their lives or preserve 
their freedom.”178 As evidenced in a KINU study and interviews 
conducted by Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) and the HRNK, 
China is correct in that some North Koreans migrate to China 
seeking only economic opportunity. 179  Still, North Korean 
migrants cross the Sino-North Korean border for non-economic 
reasons, as well.180 The HRW and HRNK interviews revealed that 
some fled due to political persecution and loss of class status.181 
North Korean gulag expert, David Hawk, demonstrates in a 
HRNK in-depth study on North Korean prison camps, The 
Hidden Gulag: The Lives and Voices of “Those Who are Sent to the 
Mountains (“The Lives and Voices”), the reasons migrants flee 
                                                                                                             
178 . Refugees, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
179. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 23, at 9–10 (discussing North Korean 
migrants’ decisions to flee North Korea); KINU WHITE PAPER 2005, supra note 53, at 
334 (providing a table showing that, as of June 2004, about fifty-five percent out of 
4,075 North Koreans in China defected to China for economic reasons); LIVES AND 
VOICES, supra note 1, at 111; see also Stephan Haggard et al., Markets and Famine in North 
Korea, 3 GLOBAL ASIA 32, 36 (2008) (“As circumstances deteriorate [for North 
Koreans], the incentives to move into China rise . . . in search of business opportunities 
and food.”). 
180. See Yoonok Chang, supra note 132, at 1 (“Chronic food shortages, political 
repression, and poverty have drive tens of thousands of North Koreans into China.”); 
Jane Kim, supra note 32, at 457 (pointing out that two-thirds of North Korean migrants 
in China are women and leave North Korea because of discrimination grounded on 
gender, class, and political opinion); Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 145–46 
(discussing the difficulty in defining all North Korean migrants in China as “economic 
migrants” due to the fact that some North Korean migrants are actually fleeing from 
fear of persecution for political opinion, religious beliefs, or membership in a social 
group). 
181. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9–12 (providing the interviews 
conducted by Human Rights Watch, or “HRW,” of North Korean migrants in China 
and the reasons why they crossed North Korean borders for China); see generally LIVES 
AND VOICES, supra note 1 (providing a detailed report published by the HRNK on the 
interviews of North Korean migrants); see also Phil Robertson, Deputy Dir., Asia 
Division, Human Rights Watch at the 2d KINU Chaillot Human Rights Forum 2012: 
The Problem of North Korean Refugees in China and Possible Solutions (June 14, 
2012) (reporting that HRW had interviewed over sixty North Koreans who had fled 
North Korea in 2010 to 2011 and found being “among the ‘wavering’ classes or even 
‘hostile’ class, and fac[ing] discrimination, harassment, arrest, and imprisonment for a 
wide variety of so-called crimes that involve legitimate rights and activities” as some 
motives for crossing North Korean borders); Jeffries, supra note 58, at 101 (stating that 
150,000 to 200,000 political prisoners and their families are detained in one of North 
Korea’s prison camps); Mike Kim, supra note 58. 
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North Korea.182 A significant portion of North Korean migrants 
interviewed for the report indicated that they defected due to 
fears of persecution grounded on perceived political dissent 
against the State.183 Several migrants revealed that they were 
persecuted for the defections of their relatives, expressing 
political dissent, and listening to South Korean music.184 
For example, North Korean migrant Lee Young-kuk’s 
testimony illustrates the experience of a North Korean migrant 
who defected to China to flee political persecution.185 In The 
Lives and Voices, David Hawk explains that Lee Young-kuk was 
Kim Jong-il’s former bodyguard who was punished for voicing 
political opinions that aligned with South Korean democratic 
views.186 Lee’s testimony disclosed, “[i]n 1994, Lee fled to China 
hoping to defect to South Korea. However, he was discovered 
missing, and because of his personal association with the ‘Dear 
Leader,’ North Korean security agents chased after him” and 
arrested him in Beijing.187 Lee was ultimately imprisoned in a 
North Korean detention center and brutally punished for 
fleeing the nation, noting that “[w]hile in Beijing, [Lee] had 
freely expressed unfavorable opinions about the regime.”188 
Thus, in examining these HRW and HRNK interviews, the 
UNHCR and various organizations have determined that at least 
some North Koreans in China are qualified refugees under the 
Refugee Convention.189  
                                                                                                             
182. See generally Lives and Voices, supra note 1, for interviews of North Korean 
migrants conducted by David Hawk and his team and published by the NGO, HRNK. 
183. Id. at 51–109 (providing testimonies of former North Korean political penal 
camp detainees who successfully fled North Korea after facing severe political 
persecution by the North Korean regime). 
184. See id. at 54, 60–62, 100 (providing the testimonies of North Korean migrants 
Kim Young-sun, Kang Chol-hwan, Lee Young-kuk Lee, and Ji Hae-nam as examples of 
migrants who fear political persecution by the North Korean government). 
185. Id. at 61–62 (providing Lee Young-kuk’s interview conducted by David 
Hawk). 
186. Id. at 61 (stating “[Lee] became a bodyguard to Kim Jong-il . . .  [and] soon 
he became disillusioned by the political indoctrination he had been taught”). 
187. Id. at 61–62 (describing Lee Young-kuk’s first failed attempt at defection). 
188. Id. at 62 (stating that Lee had honestly confessed his opinions about the 
North Korean regime while he was in Beijing and providing Lee’s belief that his 
“torture was solely intended as punishment for having fled to China”). 
189. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10–11 (noting the 
UNHCR’s determination that some of the North Korean migrants in China it had 
interviewed were refugees); see also Hearing: China’s Repatriation, supra note 123 
(statement of Roberta Cohen, Non-resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst.) (stating 
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2. “Refugees sur place” 
The Refugee Convention recognizes that individuals may 
qualify as refugees from circumstances that arise both before 
and after emigration from their home country.190 An individual 
who assumes refugee status from ensuing events following his 
departure is a refugee sur place. 191  The UNHCR Handbook 
elucidates, “[a] person may become a refugee ‘sur place’ as a 
result of his own actions, such as associating with refugees 
already recognized, or expressing his political views in his 
country of residence.”192  
For example, where a North Korean migrant comes into 
contact with a South Korean citizen or religious organization 
while in China, he risks conviction in North Korea for 
committing a political offense.193 Former prison camp inmate 
testimonies evince that repatriated North Koreans are 
persecuted for the presumed political acts against the North 
Korean regime and face punishment upon their return.194 In 
one HRNK report, Hawk argues, “[m]any more, indeed almost 
all, North Koreans who flee to China fall within the definition of 
refugees sur place . . . because of the severe persecution [North 
                                                                                                             
that in 2004, UNHCR declared that North Koreans in China were “persons of 
concern,” warranting humanitarian aid); CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 150 
(finding that a “compelling cases exists for recognizing North Koreans in China as 
refugees”). 
190. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 19 (“A person who was not a refugee 
when he left his country, but who becomes a refugee at a later date, is called a refugee 
‘sur place.’”); see also Refugees and Asylees; Temporary Protected Status, IMMIGRATION LAW 
SERVICE, §10:169 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter REFUGEES & ASYLEES] (explaining that an 
individual who does not qualify as a refugee at the time of departure from his home 
country may still qualify as a refugee if the individual “subsequently qualifies as [a 
refugee]  because of intervening circumstances”). 
191. See supra text accompanying note 191 (defining “refugees sur place”). 
192 . See supra note 190 and accompanying text (providing the UNHCR 
Handbook’s definition of “refugees sur place”). 
193. See supra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text (explaining the consequences 
for repatriated North Korean migrants found to have come into contact with South 
Koreans, South Korean culture, or religious organizations). 
194. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 19 (contending that some North 
Koreans in China qualify as refugees sur place); see supra notes 66, 779 and 
accompanying text (describing the treatment of North Korean migrants convicted of 
political offenses). 
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Korean migrants will face], as the testimonies . . . indicate, if 
returned to North Korea against their will.”195 
C. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Governing China’s 
Conflicting Treaty Obligations 
China contends that the PRC-DPRK bilateral treaty 
preempts construing its repatriation policy as a violation of 
international law.196 Indeed, China’s argument carries weight.197 
An international legal norm and fundamental dictum in treaty 
law is pacta sunt servanda—nations must fulfill their treaty 
obligations in good faith.198 The principle, as codified in Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), 
provides, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith.”199  
At the 24th Committee Against Torture session in May 
2000, Mr. Zonghuai Qiao, a member of the Chinese delegation, 
stated, “China adhered to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
Under the Chinese legal system, the international 
instruments . . . were considered part of Chinese law and legally 
binding. In the event of conflict between an international 
                                                                                                             
195. LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 115 (providing David Hawk’s belief that 
most, if not all, North Korean migrants are refugees sur place). 
196. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (explaining that 
China claims that it is obligated to repatriate North Korean migrants “under a bilateral 
1986 agreement with North Korea”); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 12 (“China’s position 
is that . . . its first obligation is to uphold its bilateral agreements with North Korea 
regarding the expulsion of migrants.”); see also Gahng, supra note 23, at 370 (“[China] 
asserts that its bilateral treaty with North Korea trumps any obligations under the 
Refugee and the 1967 Protocol.”). 
197 . See Neaderland, supra note 151, at 156–57 (contending that China’s 
justification that it must honor its bilateral treaty commitments to North Korea is “not 
without merit in international law”); see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at 650. 
198. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, July 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] for the text of pacta sunt servanda as codified in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”); see also Rep. of the Int’l Law 
Comm’n on the work of its 18th Sess., May 4–July 19, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 211 (1966) (“Pacta sunt servanda . . . is the 
fundamental principle of the law of treaties.”); Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda 
and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1550, 1592 (2009). 
199. VCLT, supra note 198; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. 
Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&
mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Nov. 12, 2012, 
7:40PM) (showing China as a party to the treaty). 
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instrument and a domestic law, the provisions of the 
international instrument took precedence.” 200  The US 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China argues that this 
statement contradicts China’s practice of forcibly deporting 
North Korean migrants. 201  But, to the extent that the 
Repatriation Treaty is a PRC-DPRK international instrument, 
China’s position is not without merit.202 Under the aegis of pacta 
sunt servanda, China must honor its obligations to North Korea 
in good faith.203 
1. The Last-in-time Rule and Article 30 of the VCLT 
Another prominent maxim in treaty law is lex posterior 
derogat priori, more commonly known as the last-in-time rule, 
which addresses incongruent treaty obligations involving the 
same state parties. 204  Under the last-in-time rule, the 
incompatible provisions of the treaty signed last in time are 
given force.205 Framed in the VCLT, Article 30(3) provides, 
“[when] all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the 
                                                                                                             
200. Comm. Against Torture Meeting, Geneva, Switz., May 12, 2000, Summary 
Record of the 419th Meeting: China, Poland, CAT/C/SR.419 (May 12, 2000). 
201. See Kim Sang Hun, Remarks before the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, Apr. 19, 2004, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/041904/
kim.php (“The Chinese government indisputably contradicts itself when it arbitrarily 
applies its national law to a clearly international issue . . . . The Chinese government is 
clearly obliged to justify its decision against the granting of refugee status to North 
Koreans by its declaration of Chinese national law as justification for the repatriation of 
North Korean defectors.”); see also The Plight of North Koreans in China: A Current 
Assessment: Roundtable before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 108th Cong., 
2d. Sess., 37 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
202. See Neaderland, supra, note 151, at 156–57; see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at 
650 (recognizing that China’s repatriation policy “arguably retain[s] merit in 
international law under the principle of pacta sunt servanta”). 
203 . See Neaderland, supra note 151, at 156–57 (contending that China’s 
arguments with regards to its obligations to the PRC-DPRK treaty may be meritorious). 
204 . See R. DOAK BISHOP, ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, 
MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 346 (2005) (noting that lex posterior derogat priori is a 
“widely recognized principle of treaty construction”); Julie M. Grimes, Conflicts Between 
EC Law and International Treaty Obligations: A Case Study of the German Telecommunications 
Dispute, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 535, 559 (1994) (stating that lex posterior derogat priori is an 
“important principle of treaty law”); see also Rijie Ernie Gao, Note, Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place: Tensions Between the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement and the Duty to Ensure 
Individual Rights Under the ICCPR, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 585, 623–624 (2010). 
205. VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(3). 
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later treaty . . . the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that 
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.”206 
Article 30(4) states that when a conflict arises between a 
posterior bilateral treaty and an older multilateral treaty to 
which both nations are parties, the last-in-time rule still 
applies.207 Where the concerned nations are not parties to both 
treaties, then the treaty to which all of the affected nations are 
parties will govern.208 That is, if China is a state party to both 
Treaty A and Treaty B, but North Korea is only a state party to 
Treaty B, the incompatible provisions of Treaty B would be 
enforced.209 Article 30(5) concludes, “Paragraph 4 is without 
prejudice to . . . any question of responsibility which may arise 
for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the 
provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards 
another State under another treaty.”210 Curiously, by reason of 
accountability, the fifth clause impliedly gives nations the choice 
to enforce the provisions of either treaty.211 
                                                                                                             
206 . Id.; see Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. established by General Assembly 
resolution 51/210 of 17 Dec. 1996, 5th Sess., Feb. 12–23, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/37, 
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 37, at 14 (March 27, 2001) (“[T]he ‘last in time’ rule, as 
expounded in article 30 of the [VCLT] . . . would apply and thereby the comprehensive 
convention . . . would supersede previous conventions to the extent that it overlapped 
in substance with such conventions . . . .”). 
207. VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(4)(a) (providing that when there are different 
parties to two treaties, “the same rule applies as in paragraph 3” as between states that 
are parties to both). 
208. VCLT, supra note 199, art. 30(4)(b) (stating that when the parties to a later 
treaty are not the same to the earlier one, “as between a State party to both treaties and 
a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties 
governs their mutual rights and obligations”). 
209. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (providing the applicable text of 
Article 30(4)). 
210. VCLT, supra note 199, at art. 30(5). 
211 . See INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND SOFT LAW 12–13 (Andrea K. 
Bjorklund et al. eds., 2012) (“[Article 30] leaves the latter party with the choice 
regarding which treaty to honor and which to breach, and as hinted in 30(5), this party 
is likely to incur international responsibility vis-á-vis the injured party.”); THE LAW OF 
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 188 (Enzo Cannizaro ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VCLT] (explaining that Article 30(5) of the 
VCLT essentially provides nations the choice to “execute one [treaty], violating the 
other” without considering the last-in-time rule). “Practice generally points in this 
direction: suffice it to mention the case law of the Commission and the European 
Court of Human Rights, which have always refused to justify failure to comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights by states claiming that the violations they 
committed arose from their commitment to earlier treaties.”). 
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2. Applying the Last-in-time Rule and Article 30 of the VCLT to 
Resolve Conflicts Involving Multilateral Human Rights Treaties  
Application of the last-in-time rule becomes particularly 
problematic when a conflicting treaty’s objective is to inculcate 
fundamental human rights and values.212 Often, a treaty signed 
last-in-time overrides the provisions of a preceding international 
treaty affording or protecting an individual’s fundamental 
freedoms.213 Employing the rule then vitiates the essence of the 
human rights treaty.214 For this reason, the last-in-time-rule has 
been recognized as a significant burden for international 
human rights treaties, specifically the Refugee Convention.215 
Scholars argue that the rule allows governments to effectively 
renege on anterior treaty commitments by enacting legislation 
or entering into new agreements.216 
In contemplating these conflicts, several nations have 
carved out exceptions to the last-in-time rule to avoid 
invalidating critical provisions in human rights treaties.217 In the 
                                                                                                             
212. Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and 
International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 393, 394-97 (1988) [hereinafter Rediscovering the Relationship] (discussing 
exceptions to the last in time rule that protect fundamental human rights offered by 
international treaties); Gao, supra note 205, at 624 (“A simple last-in-time rule, 
moreover, produces particularly unsatisfactory results with human rights treaties; such 
treaties represent fundamental norms that privilege the rights of the individual has 
human beings.”); see 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 30, pmbl. (affirming “the 
principle that human beings shall enjoy the fundamental rights and freedoms without 
discrimination”); CAT, supra note 37, pmbl. (providing that the purpose of the CAT is 
to consider “the obligation of States under the Charter . . . to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”). 
213. See Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 117, 117 
(2001) (providing a “fearsome example of the consequences of Congress’ ability to 
abrogate international human rights norms” through the last-in-time rule); Gao, supra 
note 204, at 624 (discussing how the last-in-time rule can impede on fundamental 
human rights of individuals when a conflicting treaty is one that protects such rights). 
214. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the last-in-
time rule on human rights treaties). 
215. See Ramji, supra note 213, at 117–18 (discussing the last-in-time rule’s effect 
on the Refugee Convention). 
216. See supra text accompanying note 213 (observing the last-in-time rule’s effect 
on multilateral treaties). 
217. See Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 247 (1872) (holding that “Congress has 
no . . . power to settle or interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely 
political”); Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, 407–09 (noting the ‘executed 
or vested’ exception to the last-in-time rule in US Supreme Court jurisprudence); see 
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United States, for example, the “rights under treaties” exception 
emerged to prevent the Constitution or Acts of Congress from 
interfering with former treaty provisions affording individual 
rights.218 As defined in the US Supreme Court case, Holden v. Joy, 
under the “rights under treaties” exception, “Congress has no 
constitutional power to settle or interfere with rights under 
treaties, except in cases purely political.”219 Jordan Paust, a law 
professor and expert in foreign relations law, explains that the 
holding in Holden implies that rights conferred by treaties 
“remain as rights unaffected by subsequent congressional 
enactments.”220 The European Court of Human Rights applied a 
similar principle when it held that the governing provision 
between conflicting treaties would be that of the one preserving 
an individual’s fundamental liberties.221 As North Korea is not a 
state party to the Refugee Convention or to the CAT, Article 
30(4) commands that the respective provisions of the 
Repatriation Treaty control.222 While academics have extensively 
                                                                                                             
also Robert Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of Public and Private 
International Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 761 n.35 (1957) (“Problems arising under 
the Human Rights Convention concerning prohibition of discrimination, minority 
rights, and special rights under treaties may constitute an exception” to the general 
rules about nationalizing privately-held property.”). 
218. See Holden, 84 U.S. at 247 (stating that Congress does not have the authority 
to interfere with rights offered by treaties unless the rights are purely political); see also 
Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, at 411–12; Jordan J. Paust, Responding 
Lawfully to Al Qaeda, 56 CATHOLIC UNIV. L. REV. 759, 777 (2007). 
219. Holden, 84 U.S. at 247; see also Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, at 
412 (“What this language necessarily implies is that a subsequent act of Congress 
cannot ‘interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely political’ and, thus, 
that such rights remain as rights unaffected by subsequent congressional 
enactments.”). 
220. Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212, at 412 (discussing the “rights 
under treaties” exception in the US Supreme Court case, Holden v. Joy); see UH Law 
Center Faculty, UNIV. OF HOUS. L. CTR., http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/
main.asp?PID=34 (last visited Apr. 4, 2013), to learn more about international law 
professor Jordan Paust. 
221. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), for an 
example of the European Court of Human Rights refusing to apply the last-in-time rule 
when the treaty signed last in date conflicted with former treaty obligations protecting 
fundamental human rights. The European Court of Human Rights held that a 
conflicting treaty would not supersede a human rights treaty when it would interfere 
with the protection of an individual’s fundamental human rights. Id. para. 87. 
222. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(4)(b) (expressing that when the parties to a 
later treaty are not the same to the earlier one, “as between a State party to both 
treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are 
parties governs their mutual rights and obligations”); U.N. Treaty Collection 1951 
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debated these issues, the reality is that the administration of the 
last-in-time rule is obscured with uncertainty.223 Thus, it remains 
unclear if the last-in-time rule would apply to resolve the 
conflicting provisions in the Repatriation Treaty and the UN 
treaties.224 
3. The Last-in-time Rule’s Maxim on Resolving Inconsistencies 
in Domestic Law and Treaties 
Under the last-in-time rule, resolving China’s discordant 
obligations to the Extradition Law and to the Repatriation 
Treaty is relatively straightforward. 225  Likewise, the principle 
applies to contradictions between local legislation and 
international agreements. 226  The last-in-time rule may be 
invoked to resolve the discrepancies in China’s obligations to its 
Extradition Law and to the PRC-DPRK bilateral treaty.227 Since 
the Extradition Law was enacted in 2000 and the Repatriation 
                                                                                                             
Refugee Convention, supra note 30 (listing the state parties to the Refugee 
Convention); U.N. Treaty Collection CAT, supra note 165 (listing the state parties to 
the CAT). 
223. See, e.g., supra note 211 and accompanying text (arguing that Article 30 of 
the VCLT essentially gives nations the choice to enforce either treaty, regardless of 
which treaty was signed last in date); see also Michael A. Namikas, Up in Smoke?: The Last 
in Time Rule and Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 643, 644–45 (2008) (arguing the rule has become “outdated precedent”). 
224. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30 (providing when the last-in-time rule must 
be applied to resolve conflicts between treaties); LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VCLT, 
supra note 212 (“It has been said that Article 30 is neither an accurate description of 
the practice nor a sure guide for those who have to solve conflicts between treaties.”); 
supra notes 211, 224 and accompanying text (describing the problems in applying the 
last-in-time rule); supra notes 217–21 and accompanying text (demonstrating instances 
when courts have refused to apply the last-in-time rule in the context of human rights 
treaties). 
225. See John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of 
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209, 1329 (2009) (discussing the last-in-time rule’s 
application for conflicts between treaties and federal statutes); Jennifer Trahan, Military 
Commission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do They Satisfy International and 
Constitutional Law?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 780, 819 (2007) (noting that when the 
domestic law is enacted later in date “‘under the ‘last-in-time rule’ the legislation would 
override inconsistent treaty obligations”). 
226. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining how to apply the last-
in-time rule with regard to conflicting statutory and treaty provisions). 
227. See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text (discussing application of the 
last-in-time rule to resolve conflicts between statutes and treaties). 
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Treaty was adopted in 1986,  the Extradition Law would prevail 
under the last-in-time rule.228 
III. PROHIBITING THE REFOULEMENT OF NORTH KOREAN 
MIGRANTS IN CHINA: CHINA’S REPATRIATION POLICY 
VIOLATES THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, THE CAT, AND 
CHINA’S EXTRADITION LAW 
Part III addresses the issues raised in Part II of this Note. 
First, Part III.A argues that China’s “economic migrants” 
justification is improper and therefore, the Refugee Convention 
prohibits China from the automatic repatriation of all North 
Korean migrants. Notwithstanding international legal 
conventions, Part III.B maintains that China’s duties to the 
Repatriation Treaty should not supersede its duties to the 
Refugee Convention. The last-in-time rule should not apply if 
the end result is the abrogation of provisions protecting 
fundamental human rights. Finally, Part III.C proposes that 
China implement screening procedures to provide North 
Korean migrants individual assessments to determine refugee 
status under the Refugee Convention. 
A. The Refugee Convention: China’s “Economic Migrant” Blanket 
Classification of North Korean Migrants and Practice of Automatic 
Repatriation is a Breach of the Refugee Convention 
The fiction of the “economic migrant” blanket 
categorization is most apparent in first-hand testimonies and 
interviews conducted by HRW and HRNK of North Korean 
migrants in China.229 The HRW and HRNK interviews of the 
migrants demonstrate that North Koreans reside in China for 
multifarious reasons that are not limited to economic 
opportunity.230 As exemplified in Lee Young-kuk’s testimony, 
some migrants flee North Korea as a result of their fear of 
                                                                                                             
228. See PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 (showing that China enacted the 
Extradition Law in 2000); Repatriation Policy, supra note 26, art. 10 (showing that 
China entered into the agreement in 1986). 
229. See supra note 181 and accompanying text for the interviews conducted by 
HRW and the HRNK and the varying reasons migrants flee North Korea. 
230. See supra notes 179, 181, 184–85 and accompanying text (showing that the 
reasons why North Korean migrants leave for China vary from economic reasons to 
fleeing political and religious persecution). 
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persecution for expressions of political opinion, religious belief, 
and class status in North Korea.231 These studies and interviews 
demonstrate that at least some North Korean migrants in China 
are refugees under the Refugee Convention.232 
1. Some North Korean Migrants in China Are “Refugees” as 
Defined in the Refugee Convention 
North Korean migrant testimonies confirm that North 
Korean officials scrutinize the motives for departure to convict 
repatriated migrants of political offenses. 233  This further 
establishes the truth that not all North Koreans in China are 
economic migrants. 234  If all North Koreans in China were 
economic migrants, the interrogation and division of the 
repatriated individuals would be unnecessary. 235  In such 
instances, all North Korean migrants would be convicted with a 
                                                                                                             
231. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9 (documenting the interviews 
conducted by HRW demonstrating that some North Korean migrants leave for China 
for reasons other than economic opportunity); Robertson, supra note 181, at 2 (noting 
that many North Korean migrants fled because of their political class and the 
corresponding discrimination and harassment); supra notes 179, 181, 184–85 and 
accompanying text (providing interviews conducted by HRW and the HRNK of former 
North Korean penal camp prisoners). 
232. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 20, 120 (stating that North Korean 
migrants’ testimonies revealed that “virtually any encounter with South Koreans or 
South Korean culture . . . is regarded as ‘an anti-state act’”); see generally, supra notes 
190, 194–95 and accompanying text (showing the UNHCR Handbook’s definition of 
“refugees sur place” and contentions by HRW and David Hawk that some North Korean 
migrants qualify as refugees sur place). 
233. See EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS, supra note 66, at 12 (“Fearing 
transfer to a kwan-li-so or kyo-hwa-so, or even execution, repatriated North Koreans 
typically deny having had any contact with South Koreans or exposure to South Korean 
radio stations, television programs, movies, or music while in China.”); LIVES AND 
VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (explaining that North Korea sends repatriated migrants 
who left for China only for food and employment to a different detention-interrogation 
center than those who are found to have a “political component” in their offense). 
234 . See supra note 60 and accompanying text (describing North Korea’s 
detention system and that there are different classes of detainees). 
235. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (illustrating the interrogation 
techniques and detention centers dividing repatriated North Korean migrants from 
China). The fact that the North Korean regime divides the detainees into groups of 
those who it believes to have entered China for purely economic reasons and of those it 
believes to have been in China for political reasons strongly suggests that not all the 
migrants are economic migrants. See supra notes 68, 71 and accompanying text 
(discussing North Korea’s extensive efforts to identify the politically-motivated migrants 
and lower penalties for those migrants who were not politically motivated). 
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simple non-political offense for illegal border crossing into 
China and sentenced to one of the short-term prison facilities.236 
Moreover, the North Korean class structure further 
supports allegations by numerous North Korean migrants of 
political persecution. 237  Several North Korean interviewees 
admitted to fleeing for China because of their class status as a 
hostile member, a status that in turn denied them specific rights 
and deprived them of economic opportunities such as education 
and employment.238 In addition to the UNHCR’s declaration 
that some North Korean migrants are refugees under the 
Refugee Convention, North Korea’s treatment of repatriated 
individuals undermines China’s “economic migrant” 
justification.239 Consequently, China’s blanket definition violates 
international law because it falsely presumes that all North 
Korean migrants are within its territory for exclusively economic 
reasons.240 
                                                                                                             
236 . See generally supra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that 
repatriated North Koreans convicted as non-political offenders have a shorter prison 
sentence). 
237. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (describing the North Korean 
class system and explaining that North Koreans who carry “political” taint are within 
the hostile class and are deprived of certain rights). 
238. See INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9 (“Often, economic motivations 
were intertwined with a background of political discrimination.”); see also supra note 53 
and accompanying text (stating that hostile class members are denied education and 
employment rights). In describing the interviews of North Korean migrants, HRW 
explains, 
Two different women fled to China to survive the famine . . . after each of 
their families had been expelled from Pyongyang for political reasons. One 
young man and his family left in 1999 because he could not enter medical 
school or a teaching background because of family background. . . . An older 
man, who left in 1998, sought economic help . . . [b]ut his troubles began in 
1977, when his family was exiled from Pyongyang and sent to live in an 
administrative camp for five years because of his father’s perceived disloyalty. 
INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 9. 
239. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 10 (stating that UNHCR 
“believes a number [of North Korean migrants] may meet the criteria for qualifying as 
refugees”); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20 (explaining that the UNCHR was able to 
interview some North Koreans in China and determine that they were refugees); supra 
note 189 and accompanying text (noting that North Korean migrants are refugees 
under the Refugee Convention); supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (arguing 
that some North Korean migrants in China qualify as refugees sur place). 
240. See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 11 (“During visits to the 
northeast . . . UNHCR determined that some of the newly arrived North Koreans were 
refugees.”); SEYMOUR, supra note 145, at 20 (observing UNHCR identified some of the 
North Korean migrants it interviewed as refugees); see also Carrinski, supra note 23, at 
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2. Some North Korean Migrants in China Involved in Conduct 
that North Korea Presumes Are “Political Offenses” Are 
Refugees Sur Place under the Refugee Convention 
North Korea views contact in China with South Korean 
citizens or religious organizations as manifestations of political 
rebellion.241  To the North Korean regime, these ideological 
“crimes” are unlawful political expressions and warrant 
persecution and incarceration.242 As expressly stated in its text, 
the Refugee Convention extends protection to individuals at risk 
of persecution based on religious belief or political opinion.243 
Therefore, some North Korean migrants in China become 
refugees as a result of their conduct after they have left their 
home country.244 These North Korean migrants are qualified 
refugees sur place under the Refugee Convention.245  
3. North Korean Migrant Women Carrying Children of Chinese 
Descent Are Refugees Sur Place, and Therefore, Are “Refugees” 
under the Refugee Convention 
Interviews of former North Korean prisoners also expose 
North Korea’s racially motivated treatment of repatriated 
                                                                                                             
663 (explaining that UNHCR “reject[ed] China’s argument that [all North Korean 
migrants] were only economic migrants”); CECC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 
150, at 113 (finding that Chinese forcible repatriation contravenes China’s obligations 
under the Refugee Convention). 
241 . See EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S PRISON CAMPS, supra note 66, at 12 
(explaining that contact with South Koreans or exposure to South Korean culture is 
punishable by imprisonment or death); LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120–22 
(discussing the North Korean regime’s treatment of repatriated migrants it believes 
were in contact with “foreign forces”); see also INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 21 
(listing contact with South Koreans as one of the “aggravating factors” that warrant 
harsher punishments imposed on repatriated North Koreans from China by North 
Korean authorities). 
242. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 120 (explaining that North Korean 
migrants who have committed “anti-state” acts are sent to a political prison camp); 
WITNESS TO THE TRANSFORMATION, supra note 65, at 29 (noting the different sentences 
for non-political border crossing not related to South Korea). 
243. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(A)(2) (defining refugee as a 
person who flees “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”). 
244. See supra notes 194–95 and text accompanying (arguing that some North 
Korean migrants are refugees sur place). 
245. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (contending in HRW and the 
HRNK studies that some North Korean migrants are refugees sur place under the 
Refugee Convention). 
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women carrying children of Chinese descent.246 North Korea 
executes severe disciplinary measures on pregnant women 
repatriated from China and readily conducts abortions and 
infanticide. 247  Due to the racially motivated gender-based 
violence, these North Korean migrant women may fear 
persecution for reasons of race and gender.248  
The Refugee Convention’s text and the UNHCR Handbook 
articulate that discrimination for reasons of race is generally a 
sufficient basis for refugee protection. 249  The UNHCR 
Handbook further states that, although not listed as an 
enumerated fear, the Refugee Convention “covers gender-
related claims.”250 On these grounds, North Korean women in 
China carrying a child of Chinese descent may qualify as 
refugees sur place.251 
                                                                                                             
246. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing racially motivated 
gender-based violence in North Korean penal camps); see also Mike Kim, supra note 58, 
at 112 (recounting an escapee’s recollection of a racially motivated forced abortion). 
247. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at 122–26 for first-hand testimonies by 
former North Korean prison camp detainees; see also supra notes 87, 89 and 
accompanying text (showing that North Korean prison guards often execute forced 
abortions and infanticide). 
248. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(A) (providing that 
“‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reason[] of race”); UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 16 (“Race, in 
the present connexion, has to be understood in its widest sense to include all kinds of 
ethnic groups that are referred to as ‘races’ in common usage.”); see LIVES AND VOICES, 
supra note 1, at 122–26 for first-hand testimony of former detainees who suffered or 
witnessed severe punishment for carrying a child with a Chinese father; see also Mike 
Kim, supra note 59, at 112 for a former North Korean prisoner’s recollection of a guard 
who kicked a pregnant repatriated migrant’s stomach when she admitted that she was 
carrying a Chinese man’s baby. 
249. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1(A)(2) (expressing race as 
one of the qualifying reasons for protection under the Refugee Convention); see also 
UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 16 (“Discrimination for reasons of race has 
found world-wide condemnation as one of the most striking violations of human 
rights . . . [and] therefore, represents an important element in determining the 
existence of persecution.”). 
250. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 81. 
251. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 172, at 16, 19 (defining “refugees sur 
place” and explaining that persecution for reasons of race is a common basis for 
protection under the Refugee Convention); see also supra notes 194–95 and 
accompanying text (arguing that some North Korean migrants are refugees sur place 
due to the high levels of violence in prison camps). 
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B. The Last-in-time Rule: The Primacy of Human Rights Treaties 
Should Trump International Procedural Norms 
Notwithstanding the last-in-time rule and Article 30 of the 
VCLT, the Repatriation Treaty should not override conflicting 
provisions in the Refugee Convention or the CAT. The United 
States’ “rights under treaties” exception and the ECHR’s 
holding demonstrate an awareness that the last-in-time rule 
renders human rights treaties, such as the Refugee Convention, 
ineffective.252 Applying the last-in-time rule to resolve conflicts 
with international human rights treaties allows governments to 
nullify key provisions of the multilateral treaties through 
legislation or posterior agreements.253 Particularly because the 
Refugee Convention is the only universally binding instrument 
protecting refugees, a procedural norm should not be used to 
resolve the inconsistencies between the Repatriation Treaty and 
the Refugee Convention.254 Such action would result in denying 
North Korean migrants in China the protection of their 
fundamental human rights.255 
Even if the last-in-time rule is applied to reconcile PRC-UN 
and PRC-DPRK treaty conflicts, international law still precludes 
China from automatically repatriating all North Korean 
migrants.256 The Extradition Law forbids China from deporting 
individuals to nations where there are sufficient grounds to 
                                                                                                             
252. See supra notes 219–21 and text accompanying (discussing the “rights-under-
treaties” exception); see also Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 7, 
13 (1989) (holding that provisions of the bilateral treaty would not supersede the 
conflicting provisions of the multilateral treaty if it would impede on the individual’s 
fundamental human rights). 
253. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing that under the last-in-
time rule, governments have the ability to legislate over their obligations to multilateral 
human rights treaties). 
254. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the 
Refugee Convention as the only binding agreement between nations protecting 
refugees); see also Rediscovering the Relationship, supra note 212 at 410–14 (explaining 
that the “rights-under-treaties” exception to the last-in-time rule was created so that 
subsequent treaties or legislations would not supersede individuals’ rights); Gao, supra 
note 204, at 624; Ramji, supra note 213. 
255. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting the problems of applying 
the last-in-time rule with human rights treaties). 
256. See supra text accompanying note 226 (explaining that the last-in-time rule is 
applied to resolve conflicting obligations between statutes and treaties, as well). 
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believe that they will be subjected to torture.257 While China’s 
Extradition Law does not define “torture,” a report to the 
United Nations submitted by China noted that the language of 
Article 8 of China’s Extradition Law tracks Article 3 of the 
CAT.258 
To reiterate, a prima facie case for torture under the CAT 
requires (1) physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) on a 
person; (3) by the or with the consent or acquiescence of a state 
official; and (4) with the intent and purpose of the actor.259 
Certainly satisfying the first three elements in virtually all cases, 
first-hand testimonies corroborate that repatriated individuals 
imprisoned in North Korea penal camps suffer extreme mental 
and physical pain at the hands of State prison officials.260 Prison 
guards inflict pain and suffering to punish the repatriated 
migrants for their criminal offenses, political offenses, and for 
reasons of racial and gender discrimination, thereby meeting 
the fourth element.261  
                                                                                                             
257. See PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 (prohibiting the extradition of 
persons who “[have] been or will probably be subjected to torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or humiliating treatment or punishment”); see also CAT, supra note 36, art. 3 
(“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.”). 
258. U.N. CAT Report, supra note 168 (stating that Article 8 of the Extradition 
Law essentially transferred “the provisions in Article 3 of the  Convention into domestic 
legal requirements, and ha[s] an important significance in respect of preventing 
subjects of extradition requests from being tortured”). 
259. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (providing the text of Article 
1 of the CAT and the four elements of torture under the CAT). 
260. See LIVES AND VOICES, supra note 1, at ix, 33, 161 (stating that “virtually all 
former prisoners’ testimonies” revealed that “there has been an extraordinarily high 
rate of deaths in detention,” that almost all the former prisoners had witnessed 
executions, and that “[t]orture and the cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments 
experienced or witnessed by virtually all former prisoners in the DPRK forced-labor 
camps are crimes against humanity”); supra text accompanying notes 79–89 (discussing 
the human rights violations in North Korean prison camps); supra text accompanying 
notes 66–79 (noting that repatriated North Korean migrants are sentenced to one of 
the detention centers upon return); see also CAT, supra note 36, art. 1 (defining 
“torture”); Kyu Chang Lee, supra note 32, at 149 (listing the four elements of “torture” 
under the CAT). 
261. See CAT, supra note 36, art. 1 (listing within the definition of torture both 
punishing the victim for a committed act or any kind of discrimination; Kyu Chang 
Lee, supra note 32, at 160–61; supra text accompanying notes 79–89 (describing the 
torture techniques executed by prison guards in the penal camps and the gender-based 
violence motivated by racial discrimination). 
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China’s promise to North Korea to repatriate all illegal 
border crossers in the Repatriation Treaty contradicts Article 8 
of China’s Extradition Law. 262  Since China enacted the 
Extradition Law in 2000, the Repatriation Treaty’s conflicting 
provisions, which were adopted in 1986, must give way to 
China’s own legislation. 263  Therefore, the last-in-time rule 
effectively prohibits China from the automatic repatriation of all 
North Korean migrants.264  
C. The Solution: Removing Blanket Determinations and the 
Implementation of Individualized Procedures for North Korean 
Migrants in China 
An economic powerhouse and UN Security Council 
member, China is a polarizing and globally powerful figure.265 
China appears unburdened by international outcry over its 
treatment of North Korean migrants and the accusations that its 
repatriation policy violates the Refugee Convention and the 
CAT.266 Nevertheless, China has a duty to protect the migrants 
                                                                                                             
262. See U.N. Treaty Collection CAT, supra note 165 (showing that China ratified 
the CAT in 1988); Repatriation Treaty, supra note 26 (showing that China entered into 
the Repatriation Treaty with North Korea in 1986); PRC Extradition Law, supra note 36 
(showing that China enacted the Extradition Law in 2000). 
263. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 30(3); see also Parry, supra note 225, at 1329 
(discussing the last-in-time rule’s effect on conflicting provisions between statutes and 
treaties). 
264. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text (providing the language in 
the CAT and Extradition Law prohibiting the refoulement of individuals who are likely 
to be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment upon return). 
265 . See Richard P. Appelbaum & Rachel Parker, China’s Move to High-Tech 
Innovation: Some Regional Policy Implications, in THE ASIA-PACIFIC, REGIONALISM AND THE 
GLOBAL SYSTEM 201 (Christopher M. Dent et al. eds., 2012) (explaining that “China 
has emerged as a major economic player in recent years” and that “[e]ven as the 
United States, Europe and Japan are plagued with sluggish economic growth and 
growing financial strains, China continues with double-digit growth and sizeable 
surpluses of foreign revenues”); Leo Gross, The Double Veto and the Four-Power Statement 
on Voting in the Security Council, 67 HARV. L. REV. 251, 251 (1953) (noting that only the 
UN Security Council’s five permanent members possess the power to veto a 
resolution). 
266. See Hancocks, supra note 118 (stating that China may have repatriated about 
thirty North Korean migrants “[i]gnoring international protest”); Key Provisions of 1995 
Treaty, supra note 144 (detailing China’s obligations to the United Nations under the 
Refugee Convention); INVISIBLE EXODUS, supra note 21, at 33; supra text accompanying 
notes 146, 150 (explaining how the UNHCR has been denied access to North Korean 
migrants in China despite having declared that the migrants are “persons of concern”); 
see also Ellen F. D’Angelo, Note, Non-Refoulement: The Search for a Consistent Interpretation 
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who flee North Korea for the reasons expressed in the Refugee 
Convention. 267  A pragmatic solution is to urge China to 
reconcile its duties to the Refugee Convention and the 
Repatriation Treaty, rather than honoring one at the total 
expense of the other.268 This can be achieved if China removes 
the “economic migrants” blanket categorization and adopts 
individualized assessments for North Korean migrants seeking 
refugee asylum.269 
China may be concerned that creating these individualized 
procedures might incidentally implicate North Korea for its 
human rights violations, and thereby stymie the PRC-DPRK 
alliance.270 The institutional screening procedures, however, do 
not require China to abandon the Repatriation Treaty nor do 
they require the government to publicly condemn North 
Korea’s reported human rights abuses. 271  Instead, the 
individualized assessments are justified as China’s compliance 
with basic UN protocols.272 
                                                                                                             
of Article 33, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 288 (2009) (noting the Refugee 
Convention’s inability to ensure contracting party’s honoring of obligations of the 
treaty because the treaty lacks enforcement power). 
267. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 33; supra text accompanying 
note 189 (noting that some North Korean migrants flee North Korea to escape 
persecution for political opinion, religious beliefs, or membership in a social group or 
class); see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (observing that some North Korean 
migrants risk persecution for political opinion, religious belief, or nationality as a result 
of intervening circumstances after leaving North Korea). 
268. See VCLT, supra note 198, art. 26 (providing a fundamental principle that 
parties to treaties must perform their obligations in good faith); Neaderland, supra 
note 151, at 156–57 (“Given China’s bilateral treaty commitments, regardless of their 
generality, the Chinese argument that they are bound to return North Koreans found 
to be traveling illegally is not without merit in international law.”). 
269. See Josh Briggs, Sur Place Refugees in the Context of Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in 
Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 433, 446–47 (1993) (discussing individual screening 
procedures Hong Kong implemented to determine refugee status for Vietnamese 
migrants); Rachel Settlage, Note, No Place to Call Home—Stateless Vietnamese Asylum-
Seekers in Hong Kong, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 187, 200 (1997) (discussing the UNHCR’s 
role in screening Vietnamese migrants). 
270. See supra text accompanying notes 113–17 (discussing the PRC-DPRK alliance 
and why China provides North Korea with political and economic support). 
271. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing the individualized 
screening procedures used in Hong Kong to determine refugee status for Vietnamese 
migrants). 
272. House Passes North Korean Human Rights Act, INTERPRETER RELEASES 1094 
(2004) [hereinafter House Passes NKHR Act] (stating that the United Nations requires 
China to allow the UNHCR to screen North Korean migrants); see also Charny, supra 
note 176, at 97. 
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1. China Should Establish an Administrative Body to Screen 
North Korean Migrants 
First, China should implement an internal administrative 
body responsible for screening North Korean migrants who wish 
to apply for governmental protection in China. 273  The 
administrative body’s primary responsibility would be to 
determine the migrant’s motive for departure.274 This would 
allow China to repatriate those it considers to be in China for 
purely economic reasons. 275  The individualized procedures 
would provide North Korean migrants the opportunity to apply 
for governmental protection and offer the migrants due 
process.276 These case-by-case investigations would also provide 
China the ability to protect those in serious danger of 
punishment for political offenses, as required by the CAT and 
China’s Extradition Law. 277  Moreover, safeguarding these 
individuals from the North Korean regime’s persecution for 
reasons of race, political opinion, or religious belief would be 
consistent with the Refugee Convention.278 
                                                                                                             
273 . See supra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing Hong Kong’s 
individualized screening procedure in determining refugee status of Vietnamese 
migrants). 
274. See Briggs supra note 270, at 446-47 (“In the screening interviews of asylum 
applicants, Hong Kong examiners ask questions focusing primarily on the applicant’s 
motive for departing Vietnam.”); see also Chan Kwok Bun, The Vietnamese Boat People in 
Hong Kong, in THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY OF THE WORLD MIGRATION 382 (Robin Cohen 
ed., 1995) (explaining Hong Kong’s Vietnamese migrant assessment procedures so it 
could “screen out” economic migrants and “screen in” political migrants). 
275. See Briggs, supra note 270 (examining Hong Kong’s screening process to 
determine Vietnamese migrants who are “economic migrants,” and therefore denied 
refugee asylum under the Refugee Convention); Settlage, supra note 270, at 189; see also 
Chan Kwok Bun, supra note 276. 
276 . See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing the process of 
providing migrants seeking asylum individualized assessments). 
277. According to one HNRK report, the North Korean penal code states that 
defection or attempted defection is a capital crime and returned defectors “shall be 
committed to a reform institution for not less than seven years. In cases where the 
person commits an extremely grave concern, he or she shall be given the death 
penalty.” See CRS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, supra note 56, at 9; see also Brush, supra 
note 23, at 39. 
278. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 29, art. 1. 
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2. China Should Comply with United Nations’ Protocols and 
Allow the UNHCR to Monitor the North Korean Migrants in 
China 
Second, China should allow the UNHCR access to North 
Korean migrants to screen for refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention.279 The US Congress has made revealed that “China 
has obligated itself to provide the [UNHCR] with unimpeded 
access to North Koreans inside its borders by its signature to the 
1951 Convention[ and] 1967 Protocol.” 280  Seemingly, the 
United Nations has marginal influence over China’s conduct 
with regard to its treatment of North Korean migrants.281 As a 
contracting party to the Refugee Convention and the CAT, 
however, China may not disregard its duties to the multilateral 
treaties. 282  At a minimum, China should comply with the 
appropriate procedures imposed by the United Nations. 
China should grant the UNHCR access to North Korean 
migrants seeking refuge, but may regulate the manner in which 
the procedures take place.283 That is, China may not deny the 
UNHCR the opportunity to monitor North Korean migrants, 
but it may determine the time, place, and the number of 
migrants screened.284 China may also require that the North 
                                                                                                             
279. See Charny, supra note 176, at 97 (“China is obliged to allow UNHCR 
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327 (2004) (providing the roles the UNHCR would perform in determining the 
refugee status of Vietnamese migrants); see also Yen Tran, The Closing of the Saga of the 
Vietnamese Asylum Seekers: The Implications on International Refugees and Human Rights 
Laws, 17 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 463, 479 (1995) (“The core of the [Comprehensive Plan of 
Action] framework is the establishment of a system of region-wise refugee status 
determination, which was to be implemented ‘in accordance with national legislation 
and internationally accepted practice.’”). 
284 . See Robinson, supra note 284 (noting that one of the UNHCR’s 
responsibilities was to observe and advise the “determination process, which was to be 
carried out by a ‘qualified and competent national authority body,’” which suggests 
that the nation would retain of control over screening procedures); see also Tran, supra 
note 284, at 483–84. 
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Korean migrants the UNHCR determines are not refugees 
under the Refugee Convention be turned over to Chinese 
authorities.285 The UNHCR would then have no authority to aid 
the North Korean economic migrants and China may still honor 
its duties to the Repatriation Treaty.286 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of China’s sovereignty and its obligations to 
North Korea, China’s disregard for the Refugee Convention and 
the CAT should not be permitted. The most attractive solution 
would be to compel China to uphold its promises to the United 
Nations at the expense of the Repatriation Treaty. Yet, aspiring 
to persuade China to abandon its commitments to North Korea 
is a rather unrealistic objective. Moreover, China’s obstinacy in 
preserving the PRC-DPRK kinship further indicates that this is 
goal will remain unattainable in the foreseeable future 
Imperative to fostering amicable relations with China while 
protecting the safety of North Korean migrants, the global 
community should look at methods in terms of practicabilitynot 
push for immediate drastic changes to China’s domestic 
policies. Progress towards refugee protection for all North 
Korean migrants in China is the ultimate objective, but not the 
first step. A meaningful starting point is to persuade China to 
expunge the “economic migrant” blanket characterization of all 
unauthorized North Korean migrants. Through providing 
individualized assessments, North Korean migrants at the 
greatest risk to their personal safety would be protected from 
North Korea’s draconian laws. As Justice Douglas once famously 
said, “[i]t is no requirement . . . that all evils . . . be 
eradicated or none at all.”287 
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286 . See supra text accompanying note 285 (discussing UNHCR screening 
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